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This thesis examines the manner in which Ronald Reagan 
responded to the Tower Commission Report concerning his 
involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair. It explores the 
following questions: 1) What were the factors leading to a 
rhetorical situation as defined by the media and which 
required Ronald Reagan to provide a public response of self-
defense; 2) what strategies of apologia did Reagan employ; 
and 3) how did the media and the White House characterize 
the outcome of Reagan's speech? 
2 
Data for analysis were drawn from nationally recognized 
newspapers that shaped public perception of the Iran-Contra 
Affair: The Washington Post, The New York Times, Los Angeles 
Times, and The Christian Science Monitor. In addition, The 
Tower Commission Report and Ronald Reagan's March 4, 1987 
speech were used as primary texts. 
It was found that the events of the Iran-Contra Affair 
qualified as a crisis, and exemplified an exigence needing a 
response. The thesis demonstrated that the Iran-contra 
Affair was an appropriate case for study as a rhetorical 
situation. Analysis demonstrates how Ronald Reagan made 
full use of the conventional apologetic strategies of 
denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence to 
regain lost credibility; moreover, analysis provides further 
evidence of the utility of genre criticism. 
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He has been called the symbolic master--a man who 
personified America's best image of itself, being identified 
with the values of family, work, peace, and freedom (White, 
1988). Time once described him as "a magician who carried a 
bright, ideal America like a holograph in his mind and 
projected its image in the air" ("The Unmaking," 1986, 
p. 2). But much of the Hollywood glitter once enjoyed by 
this "great communicator" was dulled. Having once possessed 
honored esteem in America's eyes, Ronald Reagan, 40th 
President of the United States, temporarily lost the 
position as most-approved leader by his involvement in a 
foreign policy crisis first uncovered in November, 1986 and 
commonly known as the Iran-contra Affair. 
Before the Iran-Contra crisis, Reagan had been sailing 
along with a healthy, positive second-term rating (as 
determined by public opinion polls) of 66% when news of the 
arms deal was leaked (Cosco, 1987). At a White House news 
conference on November 13, 1986, he denied the story of 
trading weapons for hostages ("Criticism mounts," 1986; 
Hoffman, 1986c; Weinraub, 1986a). This denial did not 
placate the American public. By January, a Newsweek poll 
indicated the President's rating plummeted to 40% ("Reagan's 
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Failure," 1987). Subsequent polls reported that a majority 
of Americans believed that Reagan was in fact lying ("Is 
Reagan Lying," 1987; "The Cynic," 1987; "A Distinct," 1987; 
"The Culture," 1987). More specifically, the press accused 
President Reagan of lying about not knowing that profits 
from the sale of arms to Iran were being used to supply arms 
and materials to Nicaraguan Contras. By denying knowledge 
of past events, Reagan's credibility began to waver. 1 
Finally, Reagan appointed a commission to investigate 
the affair. After a three-month investigation into what the 
media labeled "Iranscam," the Presidential Review Board, 
more commonly known as the Tower Commission, headed by 
former Texas Senator John Tower, determined that the 
"initiative became in fact a series of arms-for-hostages 
deals" (Tower, Muskie, Scowcroft, 1987, p. 79). The Tower 
Commission's report was devastating--a searing appraisal of 
Reagan's presidency that threatened to shrink him to 
irrelevance for the rest of his lame-duck term. The report, 
while not indicting Reagan for involvement in the arms deal, 
1Since the writing of this thesis, Oliver North has 
published his autobiography, Under Fire, in which he speaks 
candidly of the President's involvement in the Iran-Contra 
Affair. North claims the emphasis on the diversion of funds 
to Nicaraguan Contras was, in itself, a diversion to protect 
the President. It is important to recognize that this 
thesis specifically examines Ronald Reagan's March 4, 1987 
speech through the genre of apologia, not by way of 
administering culpability. This information was not 
available to the public at the time and thus could not 
contribute to public opinion. Therefore, it is not included 
in the analysis of this thesis. 
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portrayed him as a careless, remote and forgetful leader, 
too indifferent to supervise the reckless independence of 
his aides. His Iran policy was deemed foolish and 
counterproductive, and it was carried out unprofessionally 
and perhaps illegally (Tower et al., 1987). 
The President finally conceded his error, 2 but not 
before his credibility was in question. Ronald Reagan 
delivered a nation-wide discourse responding to this foreign 
policy crisis. On March 4, 1987, President Ronald Reagan 
spoke in defense of himself to the American people and the 
press on matters known as the Iran-contra Affair. 
Specifically, Reagan spoke in response to a crisis 
situation, one that shook the foundation of his legitimacy. 
The news media and the American people wanted answers. 
Reagan publicly confronted the accusations directed at his 
credibility. Clearly, Ronald Reagan found himself in a 
dilemma. His effectiveness as a leader was questioned 
because of his involvement in the Iran-contra crisis. The 
media's attention to the Tower Commission Report and the 
Iran-Contra hearings continued to focus on Reagan's 
credibility, and created a rhetorical exigence in which 
Reagan was compelled to defend himself. The Iran-contra 
crisis can be viewed as a rhetorical situation within which 
to examine the expectations for, constraints upon, and 
2The President conceded his error in terms of 
responsibility, not in terms of blame. 
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appropriateness of, Ronald Reagan's response. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the manner in 
which Ronald Reagan responded to the Tower Commission Report 
concerning his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair. 
Specifically, this thesis will examine President Reagan's 
March 4, 1987 address in which he spoke in defense of 
himself and his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair and 
seek answers to the following questions: 
1. What were the factors leading to a rhetorical 
situation as defined by the media which required 
Ronald Reagan to provide a public response of self-
defense? 
2. To what issues did Ronald Reagan speak in his 
defense; and what strategies of apologia did Ronald 
Reagan employ? 
3. Considering the answers to Question 2, how did the 
media and the White House characterize the outcome 
of Ronald Reagan's speech? 
The reference materials I will be utilizing are first, 
nationally recognized newspapers that shaped public 
perception prior to the Tower Commission Report--
specifically, articles from The Washington Post, The New 
York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Christian Science 
Monitor; second, the Tower Commission Report; third, Ronald 
Reagan's March 4, 1987 speech; and fourth, related news 
articles that described and defined reactions to the speech. 
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These materials will provide information about events 
leading up to the crisis, the Commission's response to 
Reagan's involvement in the crisis, Reagan's response to the 
Commission's report of his involvement, and reactions to 
that response. 
It is the contention of this thesis that Ronald Reagan, 
in his March 4 address, employed various apologetic factors 
as a rhetorical strategy to regain credibility and favor 
with the American public. Personal observations and 
systematic analysis of historical examples of political 
apologia have convinced me that few presidents have utilized 
the art of political rhetoric more skillfully and applied 
the rhetorical strategies of persuasion as successfully as 
Ronald Reagan did. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PUBLIC PERSONA OF RONALD REAGAN 
The 1970s had been a time of turmoil for the United 
States. Government corruption, economic problems, and 
foreign policy failures created a breach of trust between 
government and the American people. Watergate and Richard 
Nixon's near impeachment was still fresh in the public's 
mind. Oisillusionment was widespread regarding the 
political process. President Carter declared America a 
"great national malaise": 
We have been shaken by a tragic war abroad and by 
scandals and broken promises at home. Our nation 
has seen a failure of leadership. We have been 
hurt and disillusioned. We have seen a wall go up 
that separates us from our own government. . • . 
Our country has lived through a time of torment. 
(Carter, 1976, p. 510) 
The economic forecast was bleak. The Christian Science 
Monitor reported an undercurrent of discontent among the 
public: 
Not for years has there been so much speculation 
over the economic situation. It carries a special 
problem in that it involves inflation and the 
threat of recession at the same time. (Strout, 
1979, p. 1) 
We had a president who was charged by the American people 
with failure to deliver. President Carter was ineffective: 
.•. in his support of the Panama Canal Treaty, 
his initial support of the Shah of Iran, his 
unsuccessful attempts to free the American 
hostages, his handling of escalating inflation, 
his inability to prevent Castro from sending 
thousands of undesirables to the u.s., his 
inability to reform the social security system, 
and even his failure to halt White House leaks. 
(Martin, 1983, p. 16) 
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The lack of public faith in the functioning of government 
and ruling institutions had created a "confidence gap" 
(Lipset & Schneider, 1987). The public needed reassuring. 
A Hollywood movie star, who created in the American 
people a vision of renewal for their nation, emerged as a 
presidential candidate. Ronald Reagan rode the campaign 
trail with two intertwined myths, "hero of the west" and 
"the glory that was once America" (Fisher, 1982). Ronald 
Reagan identified with western heroism. In October, 1979, 
Reader's Digest published a eulogy entitled "Unforgettable 
John Wayne." Ronald Reagan was the author of this piece of 
prose that spoke of his and Wayne's companionship, their 
common values, and their fight to keep "Communists" out of 
the film industry. Reagan stated that John Wayne "gave the 
whole world the image of what an American should be" 
(Reagan, 1979, p. 116). 
Through this narrative, Hankins (1983) concluded, "the 
personalities and goals of the two men seemed to meld into a 
single heroic spirit" (p. 33). What Reagan had attempted to 
do was fuse the fictional movie image of Wayne into an 
identification with the characteristics that personified 
himself as a hero, one who would bring America back to the 
people (Martin, 1983). Reagan's image became the political 
embodiment of the mythic westerner (Hankins, 1983). Fisher 
(1982) cites Reagan's origins, his love for western 
clothing, his pastime of horseback riding, his film and 
television roles, his rugged appearance, and his personal 
virtues of honesty, sincerity, innocence, optimism, and 
certainty as aiding his image of the "Town Marshall." 
Because of the turmoil, unrest, and uncertainties 
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experienced by the 1970s, it is not surprising that in 1980 
Reagan was elected President of the United States. America's 
fascination with Reagan had just begun. Hankins (1983) 
traces America's attraction to Reagan by exploring the 
rhetoric of the archetypal hero. Hankins argues: 
Each sociopolitical era must have a human 
representation as the embodiment of cultural 
values. Although these heroic images are 
archetypally the same, their style is determined 
by social and political events of the moment and 
those events which immediately preceded the 
emergence of the hero persona. (1983, p. 41) 
A dramatic demonstration of Reagan's heroic orientation 
was his performance during, and following, the attempted 
assassination on his life. His humor portrayed him as 
courageous and fearless. Thomas szasz of The Washington 
Post observed during this ordeal, "Mr. Reagan seemed to 
possess all the virtues of the Western hero he portrayed so 
often and so well on the screen" (1981, p. Al9). In 
addition, Ivie (1984) also acknowledges the hero persona of 
Reagan. He states, "A Presidential persona incarnates the 
people's voice to lend a further note of rationality to the 
heroic call for a strong America" (p. 39). Quite clearly, 
it seems that the presidential choice of the 80s was an 
attempt to align the individual with the image of a hero. 
The national malaise of the 70s focused on material 
conditions. Consequently, the American public wanted to 
elect a western hero to "act" out the role of an image that 
reassured them that their values were being protected. 
Reagan had cultivated the persona of the classic American 
Western hero. 
Fisher (1982) supports the notion that there is a 
romantic strain in American history and politics and 
proposes characteristics of presidential heroes. He 
correlates Reagan's rhetoric to this romantic tradition and 
considers Reagan's chances of becoming a presidential hero: 
Presidential heroes need to be romantic figures, 
but they need to be more than that. A romantic 
figure need only be an adventurous, colorful, 
daring, and impassioned exponent of certain 
American ideals, such as individualism, 
achievement, and success. To be an American hero, 
one must not only display these qualities, one 
must also be visionary and mythic, a subject for 
folklore and legend. The American hero evokes the 
image of the American Dream, of the ways people 
and things are when the spirit of America 
transcends the moment, and her destiny is 
manifest. The American hero is the symbolic 
embodiment of this dream in a single person, most 
predominantly, in certain presidents. 
(Fisher, 1982, pp. 300-301) 
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Ronald Reagan came to the White House to conquer government, 
not to endorse it. Ironically, he presided over a 
resurgence of trust in the country's political institutions. 
The rebound in political confidence began with the public's 
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expectation that Reagan would be a strong leader. His 
personality, whether natural or self-managed, communicated a 
sense of pride in the nation and faith in its future. By 
the end of 1982, decreasing inflation and belief in Reagan's 
personal abilities had reversed a fifteen-year trend in 
waning political trust, despite economic recession (Citrin, 
Green, & Reingold, 1987). 
Reagan's effectiveness portraying a "hero image" has 
been widely recognized. Wills (1987) analyzed the 
attraction to Reagan in his book, Reagan's America: 
Innocents at Home, tracing the connections between the image 
of Hollywood and the ideals Reagan brought with him to the 
presidency. Wills (1987) believes Reagan achieved an almost 
magical rapport with the American public, molding them to 
his personal moral vision. Wills describes America's self-
image, nurtured by Reagan's myth, ideology, and special 
interests. He observes how Reagan combines his ideology 
with that of being a hero: 
Reagan makes this absurdity believable, partly by 
believing in it so thoroughly himself. He 
believes that terrorists will stay away from jet 
planes if America acts like a cowboy .••• He has 
used his annual messages to institute a cult of 
"heroes." (Wills, 1987, p. 381) 
Reagan personified the American dream (Berman, 1990). David 
Gergen, Reagan's communications director from 1981 until 
1984, observed, "over time, he [Reagan] converted much of 
the country to his own views and values" (1989, p. 28). In 
actuality, what Reagan changed were the country's images. 
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The basic image of Reagan as president remained remarkably 
unchanged from that of Reagan as Hollywood actor. The 
identity he had created in Hollywood merged magically with 
his White House persona. The studio movie set metamorphosed 
into the oval office. The major legacy of Reagan's acting 
career to his role as president was his unique ability to 
create the impression that his fantasy screen image--the 
western hero, and all-American nice guy--was actually the 
man himself (Metzger, 1989). In essence, Reagan appealed to 
American values by use of what McGee (1980) would label a 
"vocabulary of ideographs." Scheele (1984) supports these 
contentions when he argues, "value appeals enable a 
political communicator to identify with his audience, seek 
acceptance of his ideals, illuminate his political 
objectives, and promote his political ideology" (p. 53). 
Scheele (1984) states that Reagan employed various value 
appeals as rhetorical strategies to persuade his audience to 
respond favorably to his goal of becoming the President. 
McGee (1980) clarifies the link between rhetoric and 
ideology when he claims, "ideology in practice is a 
political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with 
the capacity to dictate and control public belief and 
behavior" (p. 5). For McGee, "the political language which 
manifests ideology seems characterized by slogans, a 
vocabulary of ideographs" (1980, p. 23). Similar to a 
value, McGee defines ideograph as a linguistic abstraction 
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which is accorded general societal consensus. Ideographs 
are employed by rhetors to guide behavior and belief by 
suggesting acceptable or unacceptable courses of action 
(McGee, 1980). Value appeals most often employed by Reagan 
were: "family," "work," "a strong America," "peace," and 
"freedom" (Scheele, 1984). The values employed by Reagan 
were used to identify himself with his audience in order to 
establish credibility and rapport (Scheele, 1984). 
Essentially, he tied the strength and well-being of the 
nation to the pride and economic health of its "families." 
Reagan's reputation as a communicator is almost 
legendary. His delivery, presence, and sincerity have been 
cited by numerous authors. The appeal of Reagan's vision 
was broad, and was reflected in his personal popularity 
(White, 1988). Even those who rejected his political 
rhetoric recognized his ability to give vision to American 
ideals (W.F.Lewis, 1987). Lewis (1987) observes that Reagan 
convincingly does this through "story telling." Reagan had 
a way with telling stories to the American public that 
transcended issues and focused on ideological images (White, 
1988). In The New Politics of Old Values, White contends, 
"In politics, the persona--the role that a politician 
assumes to communicate his conscious intentions to himself 
and to others--is the starting point for success or failure" 
(1988, p. 7). As I have demonstrated, Reagan's success came 
from his ability to play a role and tell his "story," a 
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craft he had learned well in his former profession. The 
accuracy of those stories were often in doubt: yet, it was 
the moral of the story, the value that was reaffirmed, that 
endeared him to his listeners. 
Reagan's mythological persona spoke to the values of 
family, faith, and determination. It was a theme that 
resonated throughout his presidency, reassuring millions of 
Americans that basic values were what was needed to make a 
great America. To some, his stories seemed diversions, yet 
they were also powerfully appealing. There is no doubt that 
Ronald Reagan became the western hero America was looking 
for to reassure them. He was the mythical ideograph of what 
the people believed they needed. His persona identified 
Americans with a renewed pride. However, this mythical 
persona was soon to be challenged. The following chapter 
details the events of the Iran-Contra crisis, the Tower 
Commission's report, and the news media's interpretation of 
President Reagan's dilemma which resulted in a tarnishing of 
Reagan's hero image. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
The Iran-contra arms scandal garnered banner headlines 
for more than a year, examining one of the most important 
stories of the decade and the challenges posed for the 
Reagan administration in its final year. As early as August 
1984, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane 
formally requested government agencies to reassess u.s. 
policy toward Iran. The u.s. was involved in foreign policy 
issues that included not only Iran and u.s. hostages being 
held in the Middle East, but also issues concerning Central 
America and the war in Nicaragua. 
It is not germane to this study to ask what series of 
events led up to, and began, u.s. involvement, and 
ultimately led to the crisis that shook the foundations of a 
democratic government. What matters is that government 
officials, along with the President of the United States, 
became involved in a series of events that were illegal and 
unconstitutional (questions of legality and 
constitutionality are addressed later in this chapter). 
In 1928 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated, 
"the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding" (Olmstead v. u.s., 1928). These men of zeal, 
in this case, the National Security Council, had taken 
matters into their own hands, believing that they knew 
better than Congress what was best for the nation. 
The National Security Act of 1947 established the 
organization for national security matters within the 
Executive Branch. This Act created the National Security 
Council (NSC). Its statutory members are the President, 
Vice President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
Defense. The President is head of the NSC. 
The NSC deals with the most vital issues in the 
nation's national security policy. The National Security 
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Council encounters issues that are complex, and often 
secret. However, by statute the NSC is neither a decision-
making board, nor is it empowered to take action. Although 
its members hold official positions in the Government, when 
meeting as the NSC, they act as advisors to the President. 
The 1947 Act clearly states this advisory function: 
The function of the Council shall be to advise the 
President with respect to the integration of 
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating 
to the national security so as to enable the 
military services and the other departments and 
agencies of the Government to cooperate more 
effectively in matters involving the national 
security. (Tower et al., 1987, p. 7) 
From time to time, Presidents have invited department heads 
to attend NSC meetings, which have included the Director of 
Central Intelligence and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Although closely associated with the NSC in the 
public mind, the Assistant to the President for National 
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Security Affairs is not a member. The position was created 
by President Eisenhower in 1953. Although its precise title 
has varied, the position has come to be known as the 
National Security Advisor. Under Eisenhower, the holder of 
this position served as the principal executive officer of 
the Council who set the agenda, briefed the President on 
Council matters, and supervised the staff. He was not a 
policy advocate. It was not until President Kennedy that 
the role of NSC Advisor took on its current form, emerging 
as an important personal advisor to the President. 
What emerged from history was an NSC staff that was 
used by each President in a way that reflected his 
individual preferences and working style. Over time, the 
NSC has developed an important role within the Executive 
Branch of coordinating policy review, preparing issues for 
Presidential decisions, and monitoring implementation. Yet, 
it has remained the President's creation, molded as he 
chooses, to serve as his personal committee for national 
security affairs. 
President Reagan entered office with a strong 
commitment to cabinet government. His principal advisors on 
national security affairs were to be Secretary of State 
George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, and 
to a lesser extent, Director of Central Intelligence, 
William Casey. The position of the National Security 
Advisor was initially downgraded in both status and access 
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to the President. Within a six-year period five different 
people held the position. Robert McFarlane, followed by 
Vice Admiral John Poindexter, held this position during the 
Iran-Contra initiative. President Reagan appointed several 
additional members to the NSC and also allowed staff 
attendance at meetings. The size of these meetings led 
Reagan to subdivide into smaller groups. One, the National 
Security Planning Group (NSPG), was more restricted but 
included the main members of the NSC. Each subgroup of the 
NSC was supported by subsidiary groups called Interagency 
Groups. All were chaired by the National Security Advisor. 
Oliver North became instrumental through his position as 
Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs at 
the NSC. In addition to North, key members within the NSC 
"conglomerate" involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were: 
Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of state for Inter-
American Affairs; David Abshire, former Ambassador to NATO; 
William Casey, CIA Director; Donald Gregg, Vice President 
George Bush's national security advisor; Robert McFarlane, 
President Reagan's National Security Advisor until November 
1985; John Poindexter, McFarlane's successor as Reagan's 
national security advisor; Secretary of State George Shultz; 
William Webster, Director of the CIA and former head of the 
FBI; Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger; Vice President 
George Bush; and of course, President Reagan. 
For two years the National Security Council covertly 
dealt with the Iranian government and the Contra rebels. 
This "private network" of skilled operators redirected 
American foreign policy to a course that contradicted the 
laws of the United States. 3 The entire enterprise was an 
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exercise in extra-constitutional activity accompanied by the 
familiar "mea culpa--our hearts were in the right place, 
even if laws were broken" (Berman, 1990, p. 13). The 
question arises as to how this could happen. Explanations 
arise out of the media: in essence, we had a president who 
allowed this to happen by means of his incompetence, 
stupidity, or cleverness. 
In essence, the Iran-contra Affair was an "arms-for-
hostages" agreement between the u.s. and the Iranian 
government (see Appendix A). In exchange for u.s. hostages 
held in Lebanon, the u.s. would sell arms to Iran, via 
Israel, and later, directly to Iran. In addition, monies 
made from the sale would be sent to support the Contras in 
Nicaragua. 
In October, 1986, reports of an arms shipment to Iran, 
for the purpose of exchanging arms for hostages, began to 
surface (McManus, 1986; Omang & Wilson, 1986; Preston, 1986; 
LeMoyne, 1986). This operation became public when a u.s. 
cargo plane was shot down on Oct. 5, 1986, beginning the 
broad outlines of a sophisticated operation that involved 
3Legislation prohibiting the CIA from using funds for 
the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua had 
passed September 27, 1982. 
Nicaraguan rebel groups. As reported in u.s. News & World 
Report: 
An American-registered military cargo plane is 
shot down over Nicaragua while hauling guns and 
ammunition to the anti-Sandinista rebels. The 
sole survivor, an American crewman •.. promptly 
confesses that the mission is only one of many 
coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency out 
of El Salvador . . . . (Range & Emerson, 1986, 
p.6) 
Newspapers across the country published headlines such as, 
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"Shoot-down hits u.s. credibility" (Richey & Moffett, 1986), 
and "Political fallout spreads from Iran-Contra revelation" 
(Dillin, 1986). The Christian Science Monitor, in its 
October 10, 1986 issue reported: 
The Reagan administration faces a growing 
credibility crisis over the downing of a privately 
chartered u.s. cargo plane in Nicaragua .••• 
The loss of an aircraft to Nicaragua gunfire 
raises new questions about private American 
mercenaries and their links to the CIA. (Richey & 
Moffett, 1986, p. 1) 
u.s. officials insisted that the downed pilot, Eugene 
Hasenfus, a soldier of fortune, was acting in a private 
capacity. Reagan administration officials insisted the 
plane, which was loaded with rifles, ammunition, and other 
military equipment destined for Contra guerrilla forces, had 
no connection to the u.s. government (Richey & Moffett, 
1986). However, three weeks later The Christian Science 
Monitor reported that the Reagan administration appeared to 
be seeking limited accommodations with Iran, a move that 
seemed to be a reversal of u.s. policy on antiterrorism 
(Moffett, 1986a; Pincus, 1986a). According to reports from 
the press, the motive was to secure Iran's help in gaining 
the release of six American hostages held by pro-Iranian 
Muslim fundamentalists in Lebanon (Moffett, 1986a). 
President Reagan denied charges that he was involved: 
Those charges are utterly false [italics added]. 
The United States has not made concessions to 
those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And 
we will not. The United States has not swapped 
boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for 
the return of American hostages. And we will not. 
. . . To summarize, our Government has a firm 
policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. 
That "no concessions" policy remains in force, in 
spite of the wildly speculative and false stories 
about arms for hostages and alleged ransom 
payments. We did not--repeat--did not trade 
weapons or anything else for hostages--nor will 
we. (Reagan, 1986. p. AS) 
20 
President Reagan's credibility became questionable when 
the media reported that a White House agency negotiated an 
arms-for-hostages deal with Iran (Saikowski, 1986; Moffett, 
1986b; Harsch, 1986; Osterlund, 1986; "The Supply-Side," 
1986; A. Lewis, 1986; Shipler, 1986; Reston, 1986; 
Fuerbringer, 1986). The deal was apparently made by NSC 
officials over the objections of Secretary of State George 
Shultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, and 
without the knowledge of Congress. In addition, there was a 
report that NSC officials had been involved in supplying 
arms to antigovernment rebels in Nicaragua (Moffett, 1986b). 
According to The Washington Post, President Reagan had 
ordered CIA Director William Casey not to inform the 
Congressional Intelligence Committee of covert action 
involving shipments of arms to Iran and release of American 
hostages (Woodward, 1986). The activities of the NSC were 
contrary to the stated policy of the u.s. administration 
(Moffett, 1986b; Reston, 1986; "Many Laws Bear," 1986). 
Until this incident, Reagan officials contended that the 
u.s. should not negotiate with terrorists. Later, in a 
televised address to the nation, President Reagan 
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acknowledged that the u.s. had sent "less than a planeload" 
of weapons to Iran, but denied that they were part of a 
hostage agreement (Reagan, 1986). 
The media's attention to the arms-deal incident 
continued to focus on Reagan's credibility and leadership 
capabilities (Gwertzman, 1986; Hoffman, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; 
Moffett, 1986b; Pincus, 1986a; Saikowski, 1986; "What's 
Wrong," 1986). Major news publications persisted in keeping 
before the public the failures of the President. The 
Christian Science Monitor's editorial writer, Joseph Harsch, 
reported the following: 
We have a President who has had to abandon a 
policy of shipping arms to Iran--and admit it 
publicly on nationwide television. His first 
adviser, his secretary of state, has publicly, 
also on national television, disassociated himself 
from the policy. The leaders of his own party in 
the legislature have largely disassociated 
themselves from the policy. Public opinion had 
failed to rally to his cause. • • • 
This is the sort of thing that identifies the 
absence of effective leadership [italics added]. 
(1986, p. 11) 
That same day, The Washington Post printed an editorial 
stating, "A second time Wednesday night President Reagan 
tried to assuage concern over his handling of the Iran 
affair. A second time he largely failed [italics added]" 
("At the White House," 1986, p. A26). 
Fewer than two weeks after President Reagan denied a 
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"hostage-for-arms-deal," the media revealed that money from 
the sale of arms to Iran had been sent to Contra rebels in 
Nicaragua. Reagan claimed that he was "not fully informed." 
The President then announced the resignation of key NSC 
officials. According to the media, the most serious crisis 
of the Reagan administration was occurring: 
Had he just admitted his mistake, Ronald Reagan 
might still have retrieved the situation. 
Instead, in the most critical public appearance of 
his Presidency, Reagan insisted that his decision 
to send secret shipments of arms to Iran was the 
"right" thing to do. . • • 
At other moments of crisis in his six years in 
the White House, Reagan's impressive persuasive 
powers have kept him out of trouble. This time, 
however, the President may have been kidding 
himself. 
When the full account of the Iran affair is 
written, it will surely be assessed as an enormous 
blunder. What history is most likely to remember 
in its judgment is the President's awful loss of 
credibility [italics added] at the very time he 
required it most ...• 
Reagan's power is slipping away so rapidly that 
veteran observers wonder whether his Presidency 
could wind up as crippled as those of some recent 
predecessors. (Duffy, Mullin, Walsh, Borger, 
Plattner, Emerson, stanglin, Pope, & Chesnoff, 
1986, pp. 12-13) 
At issue was President Reagan's personal credibility, and 
his ability to control foreign policy for the remainder of 
his lame-duck term: 
President Reagan is groping for a way out of a 
spate of diplomatic problems that is embarrassing 
the United states abroad and causing consternation 
at home. 
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Diplomatic observers voice concern that, without 
a fundamental shift in style, the President will 
not be able to function credibly [italics added] 
in his final two years in office. (Saikowski, 
1986, p. 1; see also Dillin, 1986; Hoffman, 1986d; 
Gwertzman, 1986; Johnson, 1986; Osterlund, 1986; 
Pincus, 1986b; Shipler, 1986) 
By stripping Reagan of his most valued asset, his 
credibility, the Iran-Contra affair had suddenly taken the 
political agenda out of Ronald Reagan's hands. Now, for the 
first time since he arrived in Washington, he could no 
longer dominate the political stage, and he appeared to be a 
diminished figure (Duffy et al., 1986). 
A CBS NewsjNew York Times poll conducted November 30, 
and reported December 2, 1986, indicated that Reagan's 
overall public approval rating had plummeted to 46% from 67% 
in one month. It was the lowest rating for Reagan since 
1983 and the sharpest one-month drop in approval of a 
president's job performance ever recorded. The poll 
revealed that 56% of Americans disapproved of Reagan's 
conduct of foreign policy. Seventy-five percent opposed 
selling arms to Iran and 58% were against aiding the 
Nicaraguan Contras. Asked to choose whom they trusted more 
to make correct foreign policy decisions, respondents chose 
Congress over Reagan, 61% to 27% (Meislin, 1986). 
The American people were disturbed by 1) the 
confirmation of arms sales to Iran in apparent return for 
the release of u.s. hostages, 2) the news that profits from 
the arms sales had been diverted to the Contras, 3) the 
emergence of Lt. Col. Oliver North as a key figure in both 
operations and, 4) President Reagan's continued insistence 
that he knew nothing (Moffett & Thatcher, 1986; Dillin, 
1986; Meislin, 1986). Reagan denied that he had 
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circumvented any laws, stating in a November 13, 1986 speech 
that all cabinet officials had been informed of the 
operations and that congressional committees were fully 
informed (Reagan, 1986). When the White House revealed on 
November 25, 1986 that profits of the arms sales had been 
secretly diverted to help the Contras (Grier, 1986; Hoffman 
& Ifill, 1986; "The Right to Trust," 1986; Weinraub, 1986b), 
President Reagan was left facing the most serious crisis of 
his presidency. As reported in u.s. News & World Report: 
The Reagan administration • • . is facing a new 
firestorm of criticism over revelations that money 
from the secret arms deal was handed over to 
Nicaraguan resistance leaders. The moves were the 
latest in a series of maneuvers to cope with the 
most serious political crisis of the Reagan 
administration [italics added]. (Moffett & 
Thatcher, 1986, p.l) 
Suddenly, the revelations of the Iran-Contra Affair loosened 
the President's hold on the public and shook the very 
foundations of the presidency itself. Finally, on November 
25, 1986, in an attempt to regain credibility, President 
Reagan appointed three people to a National Security Review 
Board to review the operation of the National Security 
Council and to recommend corrective action. 
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THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT 
The President's Special Review Board, commonly known as 
the Tower Commission, released its report on February 27, 
1987. The report presented the first official public 
disclosure of the Iran-Contra arms scandal. It was given 
weight by the men who signed it: former Senator John Tower 
(R-Texas), former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund 
Muskie (D-Maine), and Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force 
general who had served under several Republican presidents 
as a key foreign policy advisor. Underlining the Board's 
significance was the fact that President Reagan himself had 
requested it to review the Iran-contra Affair. 
President Reagan directed the Tower Commission "to 
examine the proper role of the National Security Council 
staff in national security operations, including the arms 
transfer to Iran" (Tower et al., 1987, p. 2). However, the 
short deadline4 set by Reagan for completion of the Board's 
work and its limited access to resources inevitably made the 
Board's report deficient (Tower et al., 1987). 
The Tower Commission held weeks of secret hearings and 
then filed a 290-page document quoting dozens of secret 
communications among senior national security officials 
4The President's Special Review Board was commissioned 




(Cohen & Mitchell, 1989). The orig.ins of the arms transfers 
to Iran seemed clear: 
During the Board's work, it received evidence 
concerning the role of the NSC staff in support of 
the Contras during the period that such support 
was either barred or restricted by Congress. 
(Tower et al., 1987, p. 3) 
Clearly, evidence indicted the illegality committed by the 
NSC; however, the evidence thereafter was contradictory and 
incomplete. In its effort to find documented evidence 
illuminating the affair, the Tower Commission discovered 
that within several days of the Iran-Contra leak, North, 
Poindexter, and other staff members had begun to prepare a 
chronology of the initiative. What the Board discovered was 
that in a 15-day period, this group had produced at least a 
dozen versions of this chronology. The earliest 
incarnations were merely lists of events; the last edited 
version was titled, "Historical Chronology" (Tower et al., 
1987). After reviewing these documents, the Commission 
reported: 
At best, these chronologies suggest a sense of 
confusion about both the facts and what to say 
about them. At worst, they suggest an attempt to 
limit the information that got to the President, 
the Cabinet, and the American people. (Tower et 
al., 1987, p. 480) 
The Commission concluded: 
The effort, hamstrung by poor record-keeping, 
produced a series of documents which are often 
conflicting and occasionally far from what we 
believe transpired. In short, the NSC 
chronologies provide more questions than answers. 
(Tower et al., 1987, p. 480) 
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In addition, key witnesses refused to testify, the 
Board discovered that evidence had been shredded, and 
important materials had been classified "secret." The Tower 
Commission's introductory remarks stated: 
As of the date of this report, some key witnesses 
had refused to testify before any forum. 
Important documents located in other countries had 
yet to be released, and important witnesses in 
other countries were not available. (Tower et 
al., 1987, p.3) 
On December 12, 1986, the Commission sent notices to 
Poindexter and North to request their appearance before the 
Board (Tower et al., 1987). Within four days, legal council 
for Poindexter responded: "At the present time, Admiral 
Poindexter must respectfully decline to appear before the 
Board" (Tower et al., 1987, p. 512). The previous day, 
December 15, Oliver North's legal council replied: "Lt. Col. 
North has asserted his constitutional right not to answer 
questions with respect to the subject matter of your 
December 12, 1986 letter" (Tower et al., 1987, p. 514). 
The Board interviewed former NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane on 
his knowledge of the President's involvement. The Board 
determined that, "McFarlane's various positions on the 
question of Presidential authorization in August and 
September, 1985 have made this question very difficult to 
resolve" (Tower et al., 1987, p. 484). 
In addition, no evidence was obtained on the origin(s) 
or disposition of money which had been deposited in Swiss 
bank accounts. Efforts to get copies of the letters of 
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credit were fruitless. Holders of the confidential Swiss 
accounts had opposed requests by u.s. Justice Department 
lawyers to examine the accounts, citing a 1973 u.s.-swiss 
treaty (Emerson & Healy, 1987). There was no confirmation 
on how the money had been acquired, how much, or to whom it 
belonged (Cohen & Mitchell, 1989}. 
It seems unlikely that the Tower Commission could have 
done the job it was charged with performing. stumbling 
blocks and inconsistencies seemed to be the norm. 
President Reagan's "requirement" for a quick report left the 
Board very little time to investigate. Thus, the Board was 
unable to obtain evidence to either confirm or refute that 
North had destroyed documents. Many questions were left 
unanswered (Tower et al., 1987). Even so, the report 
faulted key members of the administration, individually and 
collectively (Tower et al., 1987). It criticized the men 
Reagan chose and on whom he relied, and it questioned the 
loose style of management Reagan employed (Tower et al., 
1987). Few top administration officials escaped the 
criticism of the commission. Former National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, 
Secretary of state George Shultz, White House Chief of Staff 
Donald Regan, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and 
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey were targeted 
(Tower et al., 1987). The report accused these men of 
giving President Reagan bad advice, saying they had failed 
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to grasp "the serious legal and political risks" involved in 
the whole undertaking: 
In the case of the Iran initiative, the NSC 
process did not fail, it simply was largely 
ignored. The National Security Advisor and the 
NSC principals all had a duty to raise this issue 
and insist that orderly process be imposed. None 
of them did so. • . • 
Mr. Regan also shares in this responsibility 
[italics added]. More than almost any Chief of 
staff of recent memory, he asserted personal 
control over the White House staff and sought to 
extend this control to the National Security 
Advisor. • . • He must bear the primary 
responsibility for the chaos that descended upon 
the White House [italics added] when such 
disclosure did occur. 
Mr. McFarlane appeared caught between a 
President who supported the initiative and the 
cabinet officers who strongly opposed it [italics 
added]. 
VADM Poindexter also failed grievously [italics 
added] on the matter of Contra diversion. . . • He 
apparently failed to appreciate or ignored the 
serious legal and political risks presented. His 
clear obligation was either to investigate the 
matter or take it to the President--or both. He 
did neither. Director Casey shared a similar 
responsibility [italics added]. Evidence suggests 
that he received information about the possible 
diversion of funds to the Contras almost a month 
before the story broke. • • • 
Given the importance of the issue and the sharp 
policy divergences involved, however, Secretary 
Shultz and Secretary Weinberger in particular 
distanced themselves from the march of events. 
(Tower et al., 1987, pp. 81-82) 
The Tower Commission Report makes clear the fact that the 
Iran-Contra Affair constituted a pair of grievous missteps: 
first, the covert sale of arms to Iran at a time when 
official American policy continued to call for the isolation 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, and second, the diversion of some of 
the profits to the Nicaraguan rebels at a time when Congress 
had ruled out direct or indirect American government aid 
(Tower et al., 1987). 
Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the Tower 
Commission Report was the picture it painted of President 
Reagan: 
The NSC system will not work unless the President 
makes it work. By his actions, by his leadership, 
the President therefore determines the quality of 
its performance. 
• • . with such a complex, high-risk operation 
and so much at stake, the President should have 
ensured that the NSC system did not fail him. At 
no time did he insist upon accountability and 
performance review ••.• 
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The Board found a strong consensus among NSC 
participants that the President's priority in the 
Iran initiative was the release of u.s. hostages. 
But setting priorities is not enough when it comes 
to sensitive and risky initiatives that directly 
affect u.s. national security •••• It is the 
President who must take responsibility for the NSC 
system and deal with the consequences [italics 
added]. (Tower et al., 1987, p. 79) 
Candidly stated, President Reagan failed in his 
responsibility as President. The confidence and control 
that previously characterized Reagan were replaced by a 
caricature of a man so distracted, confused, and so remote 
that he failed to understand the implications of 
implementing an initiative that would free American hostages 
and reestablish American influence in Iran (Tower et al., 
1987). 
The Commission's report faulted the National Security 
Council's unwarranted power and the President's style of 
management. According to the Tower Commission's findings: 
The arms transfers to Iran and the activities of 
the NSC staff in support of the Contras are case 
studies in the perils of policy pursued outside 
the constraints of orderly process. 
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The Iran initiative ran directly counter to the 
Administration's own policies on terrorism, the 
Iranjiraq war, and military support to Iran 
[italics added] ...• The result taken as a 
whole was a u.s. policy that worked against 
itself .... The whole matter was handled too 
informally, without adequate written records of 
what had been considered, discussed, and decided. 
(Tower, et al., 1987, p. 62) 
The political fallout from the release of the Tower 
Commission Report was swift. Lt. Col. Oliver North had 
already been fired, and National Security Advisor John 
Poindexter had already resigned his duties. In addition, 
key White House officials were removed: White House Chief of 
Staff Donald Regan was replaced by former Senate Republican 
leader Howard Baker (Cannon, 1987; Gerstenzang, 1987). The 
appointment of Baker was the first in a series of steps 
executed by Reagan to restore confidence in his presidency 
(Cannon, 1987). In addition to Baker, Reagan selected Frank 
Carlucci, former deputy director of the CIA, as his national 
security advisor, to replace Poindexter. Beyond the 
appointments of Baker and Carlucci, other personnel shifts 
gave the President a new White House spokesman, chief 
domestic policy advisor, director of communications and 
assistant for political affairs and intergovernmental 
relations. This shift in the uppermost level of the White 
House staff provided Reagan a new cabinet for his remaining 
23 months in office. Even though some administration 
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officials managed to retain their positions, the Tower 
Commission report had weakened the entire White House 
administration by their involvement, or lack of knowledge, 
in the Iran-Contra scandal. 
MEDIA INTERPRETATIONS 
Leading news publications recounted the devastating 
image of Ronald Reagan that was depicted by the Commission: 
By any standard, the contents of the blue-covered 
Report of the President's Special Review Board are 
riveting .•.• It provides the most comprehensive 
record to date of the bizarre origins of the Iran-
Contra mess that has all but crippled the 
administration of Ronald Reagan [italics added]. 
Until a few months ago, Reagan had been the wonder 
of American politics, an apparent master of 
popular communication who had burnished the image 
of the Presidency and impressed his own 
distinctive stamp on the American political 
tableau. . . . 
But now, with the damaging revelations of the 
Tower Commission report, chances are that history 
will take a less exalted view of Ronald Reagan. 
(Duffy, Mullin, Walsh, Borger, Plattner, Fenyvesi, 
Healy & Sanford, 1987, p. 14) 
Journalists gave opinions, and demanded facts; information 
was leaked; damaging speculative stories were written: 
However the spreading scandal and investigation 
finally sort out, there seems little doubt that 
the President has been badly damaged [italics 
added]. Aides and outsiders alike fear the 
scandal may have compromised Reagan's ability to 
pursue even limited domestic and foreign-policy 
initiatives ••.• 
If that popular perception has been badly 
damaged, it may count as the greatest tragedy in 
the entire affair. . . . The current crisis seems 
to have stripped Reagan of his near magical charm 
and credibility [italics added]. (Duffy, Emerson, 
Mullin, Borger, Walsh, 1986, p. 16) 
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The day after the Tower Commission's report was made 
public, the front page of The Christian Science Monitor 
stated, "Beneath report's surface lurks the issue of cover-
up" (Thatcher, 1987). On the same day, The Washington Post 
reported: 
The Tower review board issued a highly critical 
report yesterday detailing how President Reagan 
swapped arms for hostages as White House aides 
secretly ran the contra war against Nicaragua and 
top officials lied to each other and the public 
while possibly breaking the law •..• 
Chronicling events that have badly unraveled the 
Reagan presidency, the board ••• held the 
president responsible for clandestine policy 
toward Iran that was riddled with "inconsistency." 
(Hoffman & Morgan, 1987, p. 1) 
The revelations uncovered by the Tower Commission on 
the Iran-Contra Affair did not force Ronald Reagan from 
office, but they did profoundly affect relations between the 
President and the American people. A CBS/New York Times 
news poll, conducted between February 28 and March 1, 
revealed that Reagan's approval rating had plunged another 
10 percentage points since the last poll had been taken 5 
weeks prior (Dionne,Jr., 1987a). The Iran-Contra Affair 
changed the way the American people viewed the Reagan 
presidency, perhaps forever. The response from 
Representative Newt Gingrich, a conservative Republican from 
Georgia, poignantly addressed this concern. In response to 
the Tower Commission's report he stated, "He will never 
again be the Reagan that he was before he blew it. He is 
not going to regain our trust and our faith easily" (Apple 
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Jr., 1987b, p. Al). In addition, u.s. News & World Report's 
journalist, Brian Duffy, expressed his views: 
Even with the reorganization, a new White House 
team and an aggressive public-relations plan to 
strengthen the President's battered leadership 
profile, many friends and foes believe that 
Reagan's moment has passed--that after the damage 
done by the Tower report, the consequences now 
preclude any significant comeback. (Duffy et al., 
1987, p.l5) 
As the Iran-Contra Affair unraveled, President Reagan's 
authority and credibility continued to crumble. Reagan's 
management style was detached from the details of 
government. But the President cannot escape responsibility 
by stating, "I don't remember." To separate power from 
responsibility is to undermine the concept of democracy--and 
that is what the Tower Commission had concluded. 
The New York Times Chief Washington correspondent, R.W. 
Apple Jr., wrote his commentary on the Tower report: 
But it is not any individual finding in the report 
that seemed most likely to damage Ronald Reagan's 
ability to function as a vigorous and effective 
President for the last 23 months of his term and 
to cloud his place in history. It is instead the 
almost pathetic picture of a man wholly out of 
touch with a central episode in his presidency 
[italics added] ...• And of a policy so 
convoluted and incomprehensible that some of the 
charts illustrating individual transactions look 
like Rube Goldberg cartoons, full of arrows, 
boxes, circles, number and labels. 
This is not a portrait of venality. It is a 
portrait of ineptitude verging on incompetence 
[italics added]. It is a portrait not of 
inadequate institutions but of stumbling, 
short-sighted stewardship of the national trust at 
a moment of crisis, from the President on down. 
(New York Times, 1987, pp. xv-xvi) 
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Newspapers across the country continued to keep the 
Iran-Contra crisis salient. These same newspapers reported 
the findings of the Tower report and their own responses. 
The New York Times reported: 
Mr. Reagan finds himself on the defensive, 
pictured by the report as unwilling to involve 
himself in the details of foreign policy and, at 
least in the Iran-Contra affair, unable to control 
his staff, unable even to remember when he 
authorized what. (Apple, 1987a, p.A12) 
In addition, a February 27 editorial admonished the 
President's lack of supervision over the nation's security: 
There is no graver set of Presidential 
responsibilities .•.• which commands that he 
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 
The Tower commission offers powerful reason for 
believing that Mr. Reagan failed in that 
responsibility [italics added] .•.. Mr. Tower 
now says: "The President made mistakes." ("Fair, 
respectful," 1987, p. A26) 
With his authority already weakened by the months-old 
crisis, the President faced an on-going challenge of his 
leadership abilities and his trustworthiness, put forth by 
the press. The press focused on several issues: Reagan's 
detachment, a possible cover-up of Reagan's role, possible 
law violations, and even Reagan's political survival 
(Hoffman & Morgan, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Osterlund, 1987; 
Ostrow, 1987; Saikowski, 1987; Thatcher, 1987). 
The Washington Post published statements made by Edmund 
Muskie, one of the three members of the Tower Commission, 
from the CBS News• "Face the Nation" interview. Muskie 
stated the Commission was astonished by the fact that Reagan 
lacked any knowledge of the whole affair. Muskie stated: 
We were appalled by the absence of the kind of 
alertness and vigilance to his job and to these 
policies that one expects of a president. . . • We 
do regard him as a president who didn't do his 
job. (Walsh & Cannon, 1987, p. A6) 
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Until the Iran-Contra affair became public, Reagan's 
credibility was undamaged. However, the CBS/New York Times 
poll has shown how quickly Reagan's credibility, like 
teflon, was chipped away. More Americans disapproved than 
approved of President Reagan's performance. Half of the 
public thought that Reagan really did know that profits from 
the Iran arms sale went to the Contras. Seven-out-of-ten 
Americans thought there was a cover-up (Dionne, 1987a) . For 
the President's popularity to plummet 21 points in 30 days 
reflects the loss of faith that was felt by the American 
people. There was, according to The New York Times, "a 
sense of comeuppance on the left, of betrayal on the right, 
of disappointment in the middle" ("Teflon," 1987, p. E26). 
SUMMARY 
Before the Iran-Contra Affair, Reagan could have 
maintained his image by playing the role of a western hero 
(White, 1988). But Reagan acted contrary to his public 
persona by involving himself in an arms-for-hostages deal. 
Until that act, the American people believed Reagan was the 
embodiment of an American hero, and thus, the embodiment of 
all that was right with America (White, 1988). Reagan's 
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image was tarnished because he acted out of character. The 
crisis had rapidly spread far beyond Iran to, not only the 
credibility of the President, but to the competence and 
cohesion of his administration (Duffy et al., 1986). 
In our culture, we insist that our elected officials 
account for the power entrusted to them. An implication of 
impropriety that the public's trust has been abused 
historically prompts a demand for full public disclosure, 
even when it will prove to be embarrassing to the nation as 
well as to its officials (Cohen & Mitchell, 1989). 
In the past, whenever Ronald Reagan wanted to mobilize 
support, he relied on nationally televised discourse. The 
Iran-Contra Affair was indeed one of those moments. It had 
become obvious that the scandal had created a deep distrust 
and loss of credibility between the President and the 
American public. With the documentation I have presented, 
it seems clear that the Iran-Contra Affair was a crisis of 
confidence in the leadership abilities of the President of 
the United states. 
Ronald Reagan was in a dilemma. His effectiveness as 
leader of the country was doubted. The media's attention to 
the Tower Commission Report and the Iran-contra hearings 
kept the public's attention on Reagan's credibility, and 
thus created a scenario in which he was compelled to defend 
himself. The Los Angeles Times reported: 
The President was so stung by the Tower 
Commission's portrayal of.him as out of touch with 
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crucial national security issues that he agreed 
with some of his longtime advisers that he needed 
to react quickly and decisively." (Nelson, 1987, 
p. Al) 
Reagan's challenge was to re-establish the perception 
that he was back, firmly in charge. To that end, his 
response to the Iran-Contra Affair and to the Tower 
Commission Report would be crucial. On March 4, 1987 Ronald 
Reagan addressed the nation to defend his credibility and to 
explain his involvement in the Iran-contra Affair (see 
Appendix B). In the following chapter I will present the 
theoretical perspective from which I will conduct my 
analysis. 
CHAPTER IV 
UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
AS A RHETORICAL SITUATION 
As previously demonstrated, the Iran-Contra Affair was 
a serious crisis in the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Until 
the crisis, Reagan was considered one of the nations most 
popular presidents. However, Reagan had transgressed public 
trust; the projected western hero image that had made him so 
popular had become flawed. President Reagan fell from the 
role of hero into that of an ordinary politician. The 
American people had been duped. The Iran-Contra Affair was 
a "situation" in which something needed to be done. Above 
all, Reagan had to restore his damaged credibility and renew 
the public's confidence in his leadership abilities. The 
Tower Commission report set a scene for Ronald Reagan, and 
the public waited to see what, if anything, he would do. 
The American people were eager to hear him confess his 
transgression. The action Ronald Reagan chose was to 
address the American people and respond to the crisis 
situation of the Iran-Contra Affair. 
Lloyd Bitzer's concept of a "rhetorical situation" is 
appropriate to conceptualize the Iran-Contra Affair as a 
situation requiring a response. An examination of the 
historical development of this concept and the elements of a 
rhetorical situation will provide the means to analyze 
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Reagan's response as a speech of self-defense, and thus, as 
an example of the genre of apologia. 
The Rhetoric of Western Thought provides the following 
perspective on rhetoric: 
Genuine rhetoric occurs when a communicator 
presents an informative or suasory ethical verbal 
(written or oral) or non-verbal message 
specifically designed to create a persuasive 
effect in an audience comprised of readers or 
listeners who have a choice or perceived choice 
and the power to modify the exigencies upon which 
the discourse is constructed. (Golden, Berquist, 
& Coleman, 1983, p. 5) 
It is against this background on the nature and relevance of 
rhetoric that Lloyd Bitzer suggests the parameters of 
rhetorical discourse. Bitzer proposed that the starting 
point of rhetoric was in the situation. Bitzer's essay, 
"The Rhetorical Situation," suggests that we may 
conceptualize rhetoric as discourse occurring in situations 
where solutions are wanted and where the needs or 
"exigencies" of the situation can be altered by discourse. 
Bitzer (1968) defines a rhetorical situation as: 
. . . a complex of persons, events, objects, and 
relations presenting an actual or potential 
exigence which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the 
situation, can so constrain human decision or 
action as to bring about the significant 
modification of the exigence. (p. 5) 
Bitzer identifies "situation" as a basis for realizing 
whether of not a response becomes rhetorical. Bitzer treats 
rhetoric as situational. According to Bitzer (1968), 
rhetoric functions in order to produce action or change in 
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society. 
Rhetoric is a method of modifying reality; the speaker 
modifies reality by bringing into existence a discourse in 
which the audience becomes a controlling factor to its 
change. Without a situation lending itself to a response, 
persuasion, according to Bitzer, cannot take place. To say 
that rhetoric is situational means an event, or condition, 
must take place before there can be a response to it. Only 
then will the speaker's reply be of significance. As a 
result, the event controls the way in which the speaker 
responds. 
Bitzer's proposition relies upon the situation as 
inviting a speaker's response through application of the 
speaker's method and creation of a discourse. Prior to the 
creation and presentation of a discourse, Bitzer (1968) 
claims there are three constituents, or elements, that must 
be present in order for persuasive discourse to take place: 
a rhetorical exigence, an audience, and constraints. 
According to Bitzer: 
An exigence which cannot be modified is not 
rhetorical •.•• An exigence is rhetorical when 
it is capable of positive modification and when 
positive modification requires discourse or can be 
assisted by discourse. • • • In any rhetorical 
situation there will be at least one controlling 
exigence . . • it specifies the audience to be 
addressed and the change to be effected. . . • 
When it is perceived and when it is strong and 
important, then it constrains the thought and 
action of the perceiver who may respond 
rhetorically if he is in a position to do so. 
(1968, p. 6) 
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The second element in Bitzer's rhetorical situation is 
the audience. Rhetoric, according to Bitzer (1968), 
requires an audience that must be capable of changing its 
actions or beliefs. Thus, a rhetorical audience "consists 
only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by 
discourse and of being mediators of change" (p. 7). 
The third, and final, element necessary in a rhetorical 
situation are the constraints. Every rhetorical situation 
contains a set of constraints made up of "persons, events, 
objects, and relations which are parts of the situation 
because they have the power to constrain decision and action 
needed to modify the exigence" (Bitzer, 1968, p. 7). 
Standard sources of constraints include beliefs, attitudes, 
documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, and 
motives. When the speaker enters the situation, the speech, 
according to Bitzer, "not only harnesses constraints given 
by situation but provides additional important constraints--
for example, his personal character, his logical proofs, and 
his style" (1968, p. 7). These three elements of exigence, 
audience, and constraints constitute all that is necessary 
to meet the conditions for a rhetorical situation. 
Although Bitzer's notion of the rhetorical situation 
generated controversy (see Vatz, 1973; Consigny, 1974; 
Brummett, 1976), other critics believed, as did Bitzer, that 
contexts or situations call rhetoric into existence (see 
Jamieson, 1973; Cherwitz & Hikins, 1986; White, 1980). 
Sonja Foss (1989) explains the difference between the 
relationship of rhetorical artifacts and their contexts: 
The relationship between a rhetorical artifact and 
its context is a subject of continuing debate in 
the speech communication field. Some critics 
believe that contexts or situations call rhetoric 
into existence. The situation presents a problem, 
and rhetoric comes into existence as a response to 
that problem or as an effort to resolve it. • • . 
Other critics and theorists believe . • . that 
events and situations do not call for rhetorical 
responses. The existence of situations and how 
they are defined depend on the perspectives of the 
individuals involved. Thus, the meaning of a 
situation does not exist in a situation but is 
created by rhetors as they perceive and 
communicate about that situation •••. A rhetor's 
perception of the situation, in this view, 
constitutes the situation, and different rhetors 
will perceive and define the situation in 
different ways. 
A middle view . . . holds that the situation 
does not control the response of the rhetor, but 
neither is the rhetor free to create a situation 
at will .••. Rhetors do not simply react to the 
situation; they perceive situations and define 
them through their rhetoric. (p. 68) 
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Yet, Bitzer's concept continues to be useful for analysis of 
situations calling for discourse. 5 
According to Bitzer (1968), a rhetorical situation 
focuses on the circumstances that lead up to a persuasive 
discourse. There has to be a reason, a situation, that 
calls for a discourse to be delivered. Clearly, the Iran-
Contra crisis became what Bitzer would call a rhetorical 
exigence--a situation that required discourse that would 
produce a change in the audience's beliefs. It has been 
5For further study of Bitzer's "rhetorical situation" 
see Carpenter & Seltzer, 1971; Brownlow & Davis, 1974; 
Hoban, 1980; Hoover, 1989. 
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established that Reagan's diminished credibility can be 
linked, in part, to the Iran-Contra crisis. This crisis 
demanded a response from the President. The American 
people, White House officials, and the media all demanded 
Reagan respond (Boyd, 1987). Thus, President Reagan decided 
that he "needed to react quickly and decisively" (Nelson, 
1987, p. A1). 
As I have noted, a rhetorical situation needs an 
audience that is capable of being influenced by discourse. 
Ronald Reagan's audience was the American public. He 
addressed the public on nation-wide television March 4, 
1987. It has been established that before the Iran-Contra 
crisis, Reagan had an approval rating of 66%, by December 
1986, Reagan's approval rating had dived to 46%, and by 
March 1987, his approval rating had dropped to 36%. The 
approval ratings were based on a CBS/New York Times poll 
(Dionne, 1987a). The media's interpretation, and their 
reporting of the events of the Iran-Contra crisis influenced 
the American public's perception of the crisis. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the American public was capable of 
being influenced by discourse. Undoubtedly, the audience to 
which Reagan spoke satisfies the second element of a 
rhetorical situation. 
Finally, a rhetorical situation consists of 
constraints--who is the audience, what are their beliefs, 
what do they know. Ronald Reagan had to act appropriately 
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to the constraints of the audience in order to redeem his 
damaged credibility. Reagan was constrained by: 1) the 
knowledge of events (facts) already known to the public; 2) 
the attitudes of the people; and 3) his past image. 
The public's knowledge of the events of the Iran-Contra 
Affair was governed by news reports. Because the media had 
reported the crisis, from the downed air-cargo plane in 
Nicaragua to the Tower Commission's report of Reagan's 
responsibility, Reagan could not offer information 
contradicting the already available information without 
further adverse consequences. The American public also had 
distinct attitudes concerning the crisis--they had lost 
confidence in Reagan. More than half the public believed 
Reagan knew that arms were traded for hostages ("Is Reagan 
Lying," 1987). Reagan's past image of a "western hero" was 
tarnished. Thus, Reagan had to adapt his response to the 
constraints of the situation. Additionally, the media were 
aware that Reagan needed to respond. As Kenneth Walsh, 
correspondent for u.s. News & World Report, affirmed: 
And above all, the Great Communicator must somehow 
restore his administration's damaged credibility 
and, if possible, renew the once mystic personal 
bond with the American people that had made his 
the first truly successful Presidency in a 
generation. (1987, p. 20) 
Accordingly, it was concluded: 
His (Reagan] prime-time speech this week presents 
what may be his last opportunity to convince the 
American people he is in charge of his floundering 
administration. If he follows the advice of 
congressional confidants and old friends from 
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California, he will accept full responsibility, do 
a clean sweep through the upper levels of the 
White House staff and then tell the country what 
he has done. (Duffy et al., 1987, p. 19) 
Thus, Ronald Reagan responded to the rhetorical exigence of 
the Iran-Contra crisis by speaking in defense of himself 
utilizing the rhetorical genre of apologia which will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
UNDERSTANDING REAGAN'S RHETORICAL SITUATION 
THROUGH APOLOGIA 
Ronald Reagan's response to the rhetorical exigence of 
the Iran-Contra crisis can be classified as a member of a 
genre. A genre, by definition, is a method of grouping or 
classifying speeches sharing similar characteristics. 
Reflecting societal conventions and norms, genres are 
intended to reflect how language is used in society. The 
term genre is a classification traditionally associated with 
literary criticism. 
Literary genres can be traced back to Aristotle's 
Poetics: "Let us here deal with Poetry, its essence and its 
several species, with the characteristic function of each 
species .•• 11 (Aristotle, 1973, p. 5). Aristotle proposed 
criteria by which poetic genres could be classified. 
Much later, in 1965, a generic approach to rhetorical 
criticism received its first endorsement with the appearance 
of Edwin Black's influential book, Rhetorical Criticism: A 
study in Method. Even though Black did not present a 
detailed definition of genre, he used it to describe groups 
of rhetorical discourses that shared similar strategies, 
situations, and effects (Black, 1965). Black recognized a 
limitation in nee-Aristotelian thought, and proposed an 
alternative generic perspective: 1) "there is a limited 
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number of situations in which a rhetor can find himself;" 2) 
"there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and 
will respond rhetorically to any given situational type;" 3) 
"the recurrence of a given situational type through history 
will provide the critic with information on the rhetorical 
responses available in that situation;" and 4) "although we 
can expect congregations of rhetorical discourses to form at 
distinct points along the scale, these points will be more 
or less arbitrary" (Black, 1965, pp. 133-134). Although 
Black's beginning work on generic criticism was limited, it 
was noteworthy for several reasons. According to Campbell 
and Jamieson (1978), Black's work: 
• . • located clusters of discourses based on 
recurrent strategies, situations, and effects; and 
it revealed the weaknesses of the nee-Aristotelian 
perspective as a basis for writing a developmental 
history of rhetoric. For these reasons, among 
others, Black's book was a precursor of the 
explosion of unconventional critical essays that 
appeared in the late 1960's and 1970's. (p. 14) 
Lloyd Bitzer's concept of the rhetorical situation also 
contributed to the development of generic criticism. Bitzer 
(1968) made a detailed analysis of the situational element 
of rhetorical action. He argued that rhetoric was 
situational, that it is the situation that calls a discourse 
into existence and provides a vocabulary through which to 
describe the variables in "rhetorical situations." 
According to Bitzer, similar situations generate similar 
responses: 
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From day to day, year to year, comparable 
situations occur, prompting comparable responses; 
hence rhetorical forms are born and a special 
vocabulary, grammar, and style are established. 
(1968, p. 13) 
Another contribution to the development of genre 
criticism occurred in 1976 when Campbell and Jamieson 
presented their essay, "Form and Genre in Rhetorical 
Criticism," at a Speech Communication Association 
conference. Campbell and Jamieson traced the beginnings of 
formal and generic criticism, examined the relationships 
between the concepts of form and genre, and made suggestions 
for the role of a generic perspective in the total 
enterprise of criticism. They offered a series of 
propositions about the relationships among form, genre, and 
situation: 1) "Genres are groups of discourses which share 
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics;" 2) 
"Formal similarities establish genres, and the forms 
relevant to genres are complex forms present in all 
discourse. • • they will be the forms that rhetoricians 
ordinarily call "strategies"--substantive and stylistic 
forms chosen to respond to situational requirement;" 3) "The 
rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and 
substantive responses to perceived situational demands;" 4) 
"A genre is given its character by a fusion of forms not by 
its individual elements;" and 5) "Genres often exist in 
dynamic responsiveness to situational demand" (1978, pp. 
18-24). 
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The specific genre I will apply to Ronald Reagan's 
rhetorical response is that of apologia--the speech of self-
defense. Apologia, as a rhetorical genre, is defined by 
discourses in which individuals defend their character 
(Kruse, 1981). Aristotelian and modern communication 
theory agree that one's ethos, or credibility, is a salient 
source of effectiveness (Aristotle, 1954; French & Raven, 
1959; Gold, 1978; Hoban, 1980; Hoover, 1989; King, 1985; 
Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Apologia is used when credibility 
comes into question, and the accused responds through a 
speech of self-defense. Apologizing, however, is only one 
of several options available in speeches of self-defense. 
The rhetoric of apologia is appropriate when a person must 
explain or deny their actions, assure the audience of their 
proper motivation, reinforce in the public mind previous 
impressions of their good character, correct their 
"mistake," if possible, and, as a last resort, admit their 
mistakes and promise to do better in the future (Gold, 
1978) • 
Apologiae have been used as examples of responses to 
rhetorical situations since Bitzer (1968) developed the idea 
of situations being the necessary element that calls into 
existence a discourse. Grounding in generic criticism and 
the genre of apologia to explain the redemptive process of 
defending oneself has been supported by several authors. 
In 1969, Linkugel and Razak's article, published in the 
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Southern Speech Journal, was a case study of the rhetoric of 
self-defense. It analyzed the rhetorical strategy Sam 
Houston used in reestablishing his moral character 
(credibility) when Houston spoke in defense of himself on 
the floor of the u.s. House of Representatives in 1832. 
Linkugel and Razak examined Houston's speech as a 
"rhetorical instance" and argued: 
Many men facing charges detrimental to their 
character have felt compelled to speak in defense 
of themselves. The specifics surrounding each 
incident vary as widely as the times and persons 
involved, but the speeches have the common purpose 
of self-vindication. (1969, p. 263) 
Butler (1972), in her essay, "The Apologia, 1971 
Genre," utilizes Rosenfield's (1968) constants of apologetic 
discourse to analyze Truman's, Nixon's, and Edward Kennedy's 
speeches of self-defense via nationwide radio and 
television. Butler asserts that "the success or failure of 
these men in their efforts holds implications for future 
rhetorical discourse" (1972, p. 282). The purpose of her 
study was to answer the questions: 1) "How was his [Kennedy] 
apology like or unlike that of Truman and Nixon," and 2) 
"Why did he [Kennedy] seemingly fail when they succeeded;" 
and to speculate on the form of future apologia. 
Gold's (1978) essay, "Political Apologia: The Ritual of 
Self-Defense," asserts that aspiring Presidents, and 
presidential candidates, can be successful or unsuccessful 
depending on their ability to practice the ritual of self-
defense. In addition, Gold discusses the role of the media 
in issues of campaign coverage. According to Gold, 
candidates are highly susceptible to the scrutiny of media 
attacks, and thus have been forced to respond publicly 
through apologia in order to justify motives and defend 
credibility. Faced with the dramatic event which focuses 
attention on character instead of policy issues, the 
candidate must protect his or her reputation by countering 
the potentially damaging charges. 
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Kruse (1981) agrees that apologia exists as a 
rhetorical genre and that apologiae are discourses in which 
individuals defend their characters. Her essay, "The Scope 
of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters," 
attempts to establish boundaries of apologia genre in order 
to assist critics in testing apologetic discourses more 
effectively. According to Kruse, "the first step in any 
exercise of generic criticism is the establishment of the 
parameters of the genre in which the items to be scrutinized 
are to be located" (p. 290). Kruse asserts that apologia is 
discourse produced in response to an actual situation where 
an individual's credibility has been attacked, and that the 
exigence leading to the apology occurs within an observable 
environment. The speaker's motive is thus a "repair of 
reputation." 
Blair (1984), in her essay, "From 'All the President's 
Men' to Every Man for Himself: The Strategies of Post-
Watergate Apologia," determined that characteristics 
53 
attributed to apologia discourse were present in the 
Watergate autobiographies that she analyzed. She described 
the rhetorical situation to see what constraints the authors 
were placed in to discover how they had shaped apologia. 
WARE AND LINKUGEL 
Apologia theory has cultivated strategies used in 
rebuilding a person's character. Ronald Reagan seems to 
have been put in a similar position in defending his 
character in response to his involvement in the Iran-Contra 
Affair. 
Ware and Linkugel (1973) assert that speeches of self-
defense, apologetical discourse, constitute a distinct form 
of public address, so as to warrant a rhetorical genre of 
its own. They examined speeches resulting from occasions 
where speakers spoke in their own defense in order to 
discover factors which characterize the apologetic form--
that of denial, bolstering, differentiation, and 
transcendence. Ware and Linkugel adapted their four factors 
from earlier concepts identified by Abelson (1959) as "modes 
of resolution" of "belief dilemmas." 
The first factor of verbal self-defense is denial. 
According to Ware and Linkugel, denial consists of: 
• • • the simple disavowal by the speaker of any 
participation in, relationship to, or positive 
sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the 
audience. • . . 
one may deny the alleged facts, sentiments, 
objects, or relationships •••• Strategies of 
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denial are obviously useful to the speaker only to 
the extent that such negations do not constitute a 
known distortion of reality or to the point that 
they conflict with other beliefs held by the 
audience. (1973, pp. 275-276) 
In other words, a person may deny the facts, introducing a 
different version; a person may give more information, "the 
whole story," essentially denying that previous information 
was sufficient to arrive at a conclusion. In addition, 
speeches of apology may rely upon the "denial of 
intentions," arguing that the action was misunderstood or 
misinterpreted in order to achieve affective change in the 
audience. Ware and Linkugel (1973) believe: 
The person who is charged with some despicable 
action often finds a disclaimer of intent as an 
attractive means of escaping stigma if the denial 
of the existence of the action itself is too great 
a reformation of reality to gain acceptance. 
(p 276) 
The speaker assumes the position of one who is acted upon 
rather than one who acts with intent. In other words, he or 
she is an innocent bystander or a victim of circumstances. 
The bolstering factor can be thought of as being 
parallel to that of denial. Bolstering refers to "any 
rhetorical strategy which reinforces the existence of a 
fact, sentiment, object, or relationship" (Ware & Linkugel, 
1973, p. 277). Bolstering strategies involve reminding the 
audience of previous occasions in which the accused was 
viewed favorably by the audience. Bolstering, like denial, 
is reformative in the sense that the speaker does not 
totally invent the identification, or try to change the 
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audience's attitude toward those things with which the 
speaker can identify, but tries to put an end to, or improve 
the situation by change; the speaker removes the fault or 
abuse of the situation. In the case of bolstering 
strategies, the accused is limited to some extent by the 
reality the audience already perceives. 
Bolstering and denial, according to Ware and Linkugel 
(1973), are factors vital to the apologetic form of public 
address. Denial is a means of negation; bolstering is a 
basis for identification. And finally, according to Ware 
and Linkugel (1973), "strategies of bolstering and denial 
are reformative in the sense that they do not alter the 
audience's meaning for the cognitive elements involved" (p. 
278). In other words, the speaker attempts to "reform" by 
putting an end to or removing the faults andjor abuses with 
which he or she is charged. 
Differentiation, the third factor in apologetic 
discourse "subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose 
of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship 
from some larger context within which the audience presently 
views that attribute" (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 278). 
The speaker attempts to divide the original situation into a 
new construct, or constructs, of reality which is then 
accompanied by a change in the audience's meaning of the 
situation. The charge is made less abstract. Gold (1978) 
claims, "In political campaigns, the candidate may try not 
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only to redefine the larger context for the audience, but to 
separate himself symbolically from the accusation by 
attacking the source" (p. 308). The presence of 
differentiation as an important factor in apologia is often 
signaled by the accused's request for a postponement of 
judgement until the actions can be viewed from a different 
momentary perspective (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). 
The fourth and final major factor in Ware and 
Linkugel's (1973) apologia of self-defense is transcendence. 
This factor takes in "any strategy which cognitively joins 
some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some 
larger context within which the audience does not presently 
view that attribute" (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 280). Those 
strategies which involve a change in cognitive 
identification and in meaning combine to form transcendence. 
Transcendental strategies, therefore, emotionally divert the 
audience's attention away from the particulars of the charge 
at hand in a direction toward some more abstract, general 
view of the speaker's character. 
Ware and Linkugel (1973) also argue that speakers 
usually assume one of four rhetorical postures, or 
attitudes, when speaking in defense of their characters--
absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification. 
These postures are what Ware and Linkugel define as 
subgenres of apologia: 
The types of discourses within the genre • • • 
the combination of factors found in speeches of 
self-defense. (1973, p. 274) 
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Ware and Linkugel believe that each apology is unique: 
People speak in defense of themselves against 
diverse charges, in varied situations, and through 
the use of many different strategies. (1973, 
p. 274) 
An absolutive discourse, resulting from combining 
primarily the differentiation and denial factors, is one in 
which the speaker seeks acquittal. The absolutive discourse 
denies any wrong-doing and differentiates any personal 
characteristics viewed by the audience as inappropriate 
(Ware & Linkugel, 1973). The vindicative discourse relies 
heavily upon transcendental strategies and denial. Such an 
apology aims not only at preserving the accused's 
reputation, but also in the recognition that the accused has 
a greater worth as a human being in relation to those 
accusing (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). In the explanative 
discourse the speaker assumes that if the audience 
understands his or her motives they will be unable to 
criticize. The speaker chooses a somewhat defensive method, 
combining the strategies of bolstering and differentiation 
(Ware & Linkugel, 1973). The justificative discourse 
appeals not only for understanding, but also for approval. 
Rhetorical postures used in this attitude of self-defense 
rely upon the factors of bolstering and transcendence 
strategies (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). 
Reagan's speech of self-defense (see Appendix A) 
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combines several of the factors in apologia characterized by 
Ware and Linkugel. In order to maintain an organized 
arrangement, I will begin by providing examples of Reagan's 
speech that can be applied to the factor of denial, followed 
by examples applicable to the remaining three factors--
bolstering, differentiation, transcendence--which 
characterize speeches of self-defense. 
Factors of Denial 
According to Ware and Linkugel (1973), the factor of 
denial consists of denying the facts of, or any relationship 
to, the situation. Denial may also involve the "denial of 
intentions"--the accused does not deny that an action took 
place, but does deny that there was harmful intent. In the 
denial stage, a speaker may also appear as an "innocent 
bystander" in the situation. 
In his discourse, Reagan employed strategies 
appropriate to the factor of denial. When the Iran-Contra 
Affair first gained public attention, Reagan's first 
response was to deny the facts. In his first televised 
address to the nation Reagan claimed, "Those charges are 
utterly false. . . . We did not--repeat--did not trade 
weapons or anything else for hostages--nor will we" (Reagan, 
1986, p. AS). However, when the Tower report confirmed that 
the u.s. did trade arms for hostages, Reagan was compelled 
to take a different approach. Thus, Reagan employed other 
methods of the denial factor. First, Reagan accepts 
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responsibility, but not blame; he then takes the role of the 
innocent bystander by telling his audience that activities 
were performed without his knowledge: 
First, let me say I take full responsibility 
[italics added] for my own actions and for those 
of my Administration. As angry as I may be about 
activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am 
still accountable for those activities [italics 
added]. As disappointed as I may be in some who 
served me, I am still the one who must answer to 
the American people for this behavior. And as 
personally distasteful as I find secret bank 
accounts and diverted funds, well, as the Navy 
would say, this happened on my watch •.•• 
As I told the Tower board, I didn't know 
about any diversion of funds [italics added] to 
the contras. But as President, I cannot escape 
responsibility. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
Reagan also relied upon what Ware and Linkugel define 
as the denial of intentions. The American public accepted 
as fact that arms were traded for hostages--there could be 
no denial. Therefore, Reagan was compelled to communicate 
that his intentions were honorable. Reagan no longer denied 
that there was an arms-for-hostages exchange; he told the 
American public that his intentions were to develop better 
relations with Iran, and that his greatest concern was in 
the welfare of the hostages: 
A few months ago I told the American people I did 
not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best 
intentions still tell me that is true [italics 
added], but the facts and the evidence tell me it 
is not. • • . 
I undertook the original Iran initiative in 
order to develop relations with those who might 
assume leadership in a post-Khomeini Government. 
• • • I let my personal concern for the hostages 
spill over in to geopolitical strategy of reaching 
out to Iran. I asked so many questions about the 
hostages' welfare that I didn't ask enough about 
the specifics of the total plan. (Reagan, 1987, 
p. 323) 
Factors of Bolstering 
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Reagan did not stop with strategies of denial. He 
moved from the denial stage into strategies of bolstering. 
Reagan reminds the audience of his attributes that the 
public had previously viewed as favorable: 
I'm often accused of being an optimist [italics 
added] .•.. 
Much has been said about my management style, a 
style that's worked successfully for me [italics 
added] during my eight years as governor of 
California and for most of my presidency. The way 
I work is to identify the problem, find the right 
individuals to do the job and then let them go do 
it. I've found this invariably brings out the 
best in people. They seem to rise to their full 
capability, and in the long run you get more done 
[italics added]. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
Reagan then moves toward trying to improve the situation by 
change--he tells his audience that he is taking steps to 
remove the abuse that took place: 
I've already begun correcting this. As a start, 
yesterday I met with the entire professional staff 
of the National Security Council. I defined for 
them the values I want to guide the national 
security policies of this country. I told them 
that I wanted a policy that was as justifiable and 
understandable in public as it was in secret. . 
And I told them that there'll be no more 
·freelancing by individuals when it comes to our 
national security .••• 
I'm going beyond its [Tower board] 
recommendations, so as to put the house in even 
better order. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
In bolstering, Reagan had to identify with something that 
was viewed favorably by the audience. The American people 
61 
wanted the blunder corrected. Most of Reagan's speech did 
just that. He told his audience that he was taking steps 
for more accountability in the areas of personnel, national 
security policy, and the process for making decisions 
(Reagan, 1987). He gave an in depth report of all changes 
that would take place, and the changes that had already 
taken place: 
I'm taking action •..• 
I've brought in an accomplished and highly 
respected new team. • • • 
... my new chief of staff •... 
• • • my new national security adviser • • 
Already, almost half the N.s.c. professional staff 
is comprised of new people. . • • 
Yesterday I nominated • • . . 
• • I have ordered • • • 
I have also directed • • • . 
I have had issued . . 
I have asked . • • • 
• • . I am adopting . • • • 
I've created .... 
I am also determined. • • • Proper procedures 
• • • will be followed, not only in letter but in 
spirit. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
Reagan relied primarily on the factor of bolstering. 
His purpose seemed to be one that he used quite frequently 
in other discourses--identifying his views and values with 
that of the American public's (White, 1988). Realizing the 
effects the scandal had caused regarding his own 
credibility, Reagan used the strategy of bolstering when he 
told his audience that changes would be made so that a 
crisis like this would not happen again. 
Factors of Differentiation 
Strategies within the factor of differentiation are 
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used in order to separate the situation or crisis from the 
larger context within which the audience presently views it, 
or to change the audience's understanding of the situation 
by urging the audience to postpone judgement so that the 
situation can be viewed differently (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). 
The information that the audience received about the Iran-
Contra Affair was so damaging that trying to change the 
American public's understanding of the situation would not 
have been realistic. However, Reagan did attempt to 
separate himself from the Iran-Contra Affair and implies 
that the audience should defer judgement until they have all 
of the facts: 
The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is 
this: You deserved the truth. And, as frustrating 
as the waiting has been, I felt it was improper to 
come to you with sketchy reports, or possibly even 
erroneous statements, which would then have to be 
corrected, creating even more doubt and confusion. 
There's been enough of that. 
I've paid a price for my silence in terms of 
your trust and confidence. But I have had to 
wait, as have you [italics added], for the 
complete story. (Reagan, 1987, p. 322) 
Reagan separates himself from the situation by attacking 
those involved, "This runs counter to my own beliefs 
[italics added], to Administration policy and to the 
original strategy we had in mind" (Reagan, 1987, p. 323). 
Factors of Transcendence 
The final factor in Ware and Linkugel's taxonomy is 
transcendence. Those strategies which involve a 
modification in cognitive identification and in meaning 
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combine to form transcendence (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). 
Transcendental strategies emotionally shift the audience 
away from a specific accusation toward a more ideal view of 
the speaker's character. Reagan diverted the audience away 
from the specific crisis of selling arms to a foreign enemy 
by ignoring questions raised by the Tower review board; he 
did not address the report that NSC advisors secretly 
managed aid to Contra rebels. He even ignored the board's 
disclosure of his top aides covering up the affair. What 
Reagan did was shift the audience's attention toward the 
Tower Report's recommendations. He reminded his audience 
that it was he who requested a thorough investigation into 
the Iran-Contra Affair; and it was he who reminded the 
audience of his absolution, by the Tower Commission, of any 
guilt. 
Reagan goes beyond the reasons for the investigation 
and directs the audience's attention toward other issues. 
He transcends the problem of the N.S.c.•s trustworthiness 
and explains how dedicated the N.S.C. is: 
You've heard a 




lot about the staff ..•. I can 
are good and dedicated Government 
put in long hours for the nation's 
are eager and anxious to serve 
(Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
Reagan shifts attention from the Tower Report's 
findings, to personally addressing the hostage families: 
Let me say to the hostage families, we have not 
given up. We never will, and I promise you we'll 
use every legitimate means to free your loved ones 
from captivity. But I must caution that those 
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Americans who freely remain in such dangerous 
areas must know that they're responsible for their 
own safety. (Reagan, 1987, p. 323) 
Finally, Reagan becomes the main character in his own 
narrative. He attempts to create an identification with his 
audience in order for them to experience the trauma of 
overcoming a crisis situation. He talks about what happens 
when people make mistakes: 
You take your knocks, you learn your lessons and 
then you move on [italics added]. That's the 
healthiest way to deal with a problem. • • • The 
business of our country must proceed [italics 
added] .••• I've heard this message from you, 
the American people. 
You know, by the time you reach my age, you've 
made plenty of mistakes if you've lived your life 
properly. So you learn. You put things in 
perspective. You pull your energies together. 
You change. You go forward [italics added]. 
My fellow Americans, I have a great deal that I 
want to accomplish [italics added] with you and 
for you over the next two years, and, the Lord 
willing, that's exactly what I intend to do 
[italics added]. (Reagan, 1987, p. 324) 
Ronald Reagan transcended the original emphasis of his 
discourse, that of denying guilt, and told a story about how 
good people make mistakes, that mistakes are a part of 
life --if you learn from your mistakes. Reagan attempted to 
divert his audience away from the accusations of guilt to 
starting over and leaving the past. 
Postures of Apologia 
Ware and Linkugel (1973) believe that in speeches of 
self-defense a speaker usually assumes a certain posture, or 
attitude, when delivering a discourse. The postures Ware 
and Linkugel have identified are 1) absolution; 2) 
vindication; 3) explanation; and 4) justification. In 
analyzing Reagan's apologetic discourse I found that he 
assumed more than just one posture. 
Reagan combined the factors of denial, bolstering, 
differentiation, and transcendence throughout his speech. 
Although Ware and Linkugel assert that a speaker usually 
assumes one of four rhetorical postures when defending his 
or her character, I have determined that Reagan, from time 
to time, assumed all four postures. Reagan attempted to 
absolve himself from the crisis by denying any wrong-doing 
and by requesting his audience to postpone judgement until 
all facts had been revealed. 
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A goal of Reagan's speech was to sustain his 
reputation. One of the reasons he chose to address the 
American public was to regain the credibility that he had 
lost. Through vindication Reagan asked the audience to view 
him as having a greater worth than the image that was 
focused on him due to the Iran-Contra crisis. 
In assuming a justificative posture, speakers appeal to 
audiences for understanding and approval. Reagan relied 
upon the factors of bolstering and transcendence--he sought 
the audience's understanding and their approval. 
The major strategy Reagan used in his speech was 
bolstering. Bolstering and differentiation is classified by 
Ware and Linkugel (1973) under the posture of explanation. 
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Reagan's primary purpose in speaking was one of explanation. 
Although Reagan found the need to absolve himself from 
accusations of guilt, there was a greater need to explain 
why the crisis took place, and, that changes would take 
place so that situations like this would not happen in the 
future. 
SUMMARY 
President Reagan's response to the Tower Commission's 
report can be identified as apologia--a speech of self-
defense. His speech illustrates those factors that Ware and 
Linkugel allege are necessary when defending a person's 
credibility. Understanding those factors used in apologia 
are beneficial to the rhetorical critic when examining 
speeches used in self-defense. 
Ronald Reagan's involvement in the Iran-Contra crisis 
compelled him to respond to the public and explain the 
situation. His discourse required the use of specific 
strategies necessary to rebuild a person's credibility. 
Reagan applied the communication skills he had used so 
successfully in the past. President Reagan had to combat the 
image that had been forced upon him due to the Tower Report. 
The ability to recover had rested squarely on his shoulders 
(Boyd, 1987; "The Tower," 1987). In the following chapter I 
will draw upon the media's assessment of Reagan's discourse 
to ascertain whether Reagan recovered his lost credibility. 
CHAPTER VI 
MEDIA ASSESSMENTS OF REAGAN'S RESPONSE 
On the evening of March 4, 1987, as Ronald Reagan stood 
before the nation to deliver his discourse, the media and 
the American public awaited his words. The media loved 
crucifixions, but the American public loved repentance and 
resurrections (Boyd, 1987). 
While there is no doubt that the Iran-Contra Affair 
diminished the public's faith in Reagan's credibility, 
evaluations by the media of Reagan's March 4 discourse 
indicated approval of the rhetorical strategies used. The 
day after President Reagan delivered his discourse, The 
Washington Post reported: 
Leaders of both parties said last night they think 
that President Reagan has turned the corner toward 
political recovery [italics added] by 
acknowledging responsibility for failings of his 
Iran policy and taking credible steps to improve 
his White House staff and national-security 
operation. (Broder & Walsh, 1987, p. A1) 
Writers and commentators for The Washington Post continued 
their evaluations of Reagan's discourse: 
Last night's televised address by Ronald Reagan 
was one of the most crucial of his presidency, a 
screen test in the literal sense, and a first 
impression is that he passed it [italics added]. 
(Shales, 1987, p. B1) 
The media believed Reagan was reauditioning for the role of 
"The Gipper," and that he had played his part well: "he was 
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masterful and his buoyancy reassuring [italics added]" 
(Shales, 1987, p. Bl). Shales final assessment of Reagan's 
speech was that The Gipper was back: 
If you could have taken a voice vote of viewers at 
the moment the speech ended, it's likely they 
would have chosen precisely what their pal the 
president wanted. It sounded so right and 
reasonable they way he said it [italics added]. 
(1987, p. B4) 
Commentator Richard Cohen assessed Reagan's speech as 
"making a comeback." Although Cohen stated, "A speech is 
just a speech," he also admitted, "But this was a good, not 
to mention clever, one" (1987, p. A23). He believed that 
Reagan had met the test others had set for him: 
The easiest thing in public life is to accept 
responsibility. The hardest is to accept blame. 
There is a world of difference between them, and 
in his televised speech to the nation, President 
Reagan closed the gap that he had opened between 
the two. He accepted both. (Cohen, 1987, p. A23) 
Cohen also scored Reagan above others who had attempted to 
redeem their credibility, but had failed: 
As always, Reagan set his own grading curve. 
Where others would be faulted, he is pardoned 
[italics added]. Where others would be held 
accountable, he is not. He advances into 
every political battle shielded by his own 
shimmering persona--his humanity, his total 
oneness with the American people. That was on 
display Wednesday night. He remains what he 
always was: a winning and engaging man [italics 
added]. (1987, p. A23) 
Los Angeles Times columnist David Broder questioned why 
Reagan had taken so long to tell the public of the mistakes 
that were made: "Historians of the Reagan presidency will 
face the challenge of explaining why he delayed so long in 
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saying and doing things that were so clearly necessary and 
so evidently in the nation's interest" (1987, p. B5). Even 
so, Broder appraised Reagan's speech as "a new beginning." 
Journalists continued to write of the magic Reagan was 
able to invoke in his speech: 
Ronald Reagan is back [italics added]. Only a few 
weeks ago it looked to many as though the last two 
years of the Reagan presidency would be 
unsalvageable. • • • But the diatribe against this 
President is softening as he performs his magic of 
reconciliation [italics added] with Congress and 
the American public. • . . 
So far, President Reagan is making maximum 
benefit of a recovery that many said could never 
happen [italics added]. (Nickles, 1987, p. B5) 
Although Democrats tried their best to diffuse Reagan's 
performance, Republicans, eager to put the affair behind 
them, described Reagan's speech as "a turning point": 
President Reagan's speech tonight was a turning 
point in the crisis [italics added] •••• 
"The Gipper's back [italics added]," said 
Senator Dan Quayle, Republican of Indiana. "He's 
learned his lesson and he's ready to move 
forward." John G. Tower, a Republican who headed 
the Presidential board that investigated the 
affair, called the President's performance 
"brilliant [italics added]." (Dionne, 1987b, 
p. Al8) 
In addition, a New York Times news analysis compared 
Reagan's response to the Iran-Contra crisis to that of John 
F. Kennedy and his response to the Bay of Pigs fiasco: 
President Reagan spoke to the American people 
tonight in a spirit of contrition that has not 
been heard from the White House in a quarter 
century •••• Not since John F. Kennedy took the 
blame for the catastrophic Bay of Pigs invasion in 
1961 has any President so openly confessed error. 
President Kennedy [like Reagan] did not 
explicitly apologize after the Bay of Pigs 
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invasion, nor did he describe his polices as a 
failure. He said the United States would "profit 
from this lesson," remarked that "victory has a 
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan," and 
pointedly, "I'm the responsible officer of the 
Government." 
In very much the same spirit, Mr. Reagan 
declared tonight, "This happened on my watch." 
(Apple, 1987b, pp. Al,A18; see also Borger & 
Walsh, 1987) 
Clearly, the consensus of the media was that President 
Reagan gave the right speech to reestablish his credibility. 
He did not apologize, yet he assumed responsibility. Reagan 
admitted mistakes and pledged to redeem the damage in his 
final two years in office. There was no crucifixion, as 
some had speculated (Boyd, 1987), just repentance and 
resurrection. Less than one week later Reagan's credibility 




Historical documents provide evidence that the Iran-
Contra Affair significantly diminished President Reagan's 
high credibility standing with the American public. Reagan 
responded to the rhetorical situation, defended his 
credibility through a speech of self-defense, and regained 
the confidence of the American people. Following his 
speech, Reagan's credibility rating slowly increased. 
Although other factors may have contributed to the increase, 
news polls clearly confirmed an immediate increase in 
Reagan's approval rating after he delivered his discourse 
("Opinion," 1988). 
Reagan survived. He was able to defuse the situation 
and rebuild his credibility. His popularity and apparent 
sincerity had a positive effect on his success because 
people tend to believe and accept facts from someone they 
like or trust (Cosec, 1987). The American people forgave 
him. 
In the past, Reagan engendered trust from the American 
people. After his discourse, Reagan continued to draw from 
"the well." When President Reagan left office in January 
1989, 68% of the American people approved of his overall job 
performance, 71% approved of his handling of foreign 
relations, and 62% approved of his handling of the economy 
(Roberts, 1989). 
72 
In assessing Reagan's discourse as a speech of self-
defense in response to a rhetorical situation, I have 
established that the events of the Iran-Contra Affair 
qualify as a crisis, and thus exemplify an exigence needing 
a response. I have demonstrated this through the elements 
of Bitzer's rhetorical situation by applying Reagan's 
response to the genre of apologia and the strategies useful 
in defending oneself. 
An examination of Ronald Reagan's response, analyzed 
through the rhetorical genre of apologia, reveals the 
following: 1) The Iran-Contra Affair is an appropriate 
example and study for a rhetorical situation; 2) Ronald 
Reagan made full use of the conventional apologetic 
strategies of denial, bolstering, differentiation, and 
transcendence outlined by Ware and Linkugel; and 3) the 
utility of understanding apologia as a set of strategies for 
rebuilding credibility should be viewed as a salient 
constant. 
This study confirms the utility of a particular genre--
that of apologia. It also suggests that there is a special 
relationship between the presidency and the populace. 
Presidential figures have, in the past, been placed before 
the public in regard to defending themselves: Lyndon Johnson 
defended his plans for expanding the Vietnam war; Richard 
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Nixon defended his involvement in the Watergate break-in; 
Jimmy Carter defended his intention to carry out the Desert 
One hostage rescue mission ("The Culture," 1987). In each 
situation the issue became the defense of one's character, 
not policy. Where these men failed, Reagan was successful. 
The media liked what he said and what he said pertained to 
the particular strategies of denial, bolstering, 
differentiation, and transcendence. 
The persistent probing of the media into a person's 
moral character makes apologetic responses more difficult 
today. As Gold states: 
The power of contemporary mass media to transmit 
and repeat such charges all over the country means 
that even frivolous accusations have great 
damaging potential. (1978, p. 308) 
Presidential candidates are finding that their moral 
character is more newsworthy than their issues, policies and 
voting records. Reagan was successful, in spite of 
contemporary media. 
One could conclude, and further study may suggest, that 
part of the relationship between the presidency and the 
populace may be in the form of symbolic performance--
degradation rituals. There are times when a president must 
humble himself before the people before he can be elevated. 
It is entirely possible to argue that the rhetorical 
techniques and strategies available to politicians in 
defending themselves from attacks on their character can be 
generalized as a form of political apologia. A presidential 
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candidate's ability to cope with the accusations against his 
credibility and his response may be the determining factor 
of the election. Aspiring presidents may win or lose 
depending on their ability to practice the ritual of self-
defense (Gold, 1978). Thus, when those in the public eye 
are faced with similar situations, they would be wise to 
follow the strategies employed by Reagan using the 
rhetorical genre of apologia in order to be successful. 
Ronald Reagan's discourse is a valuable model in the 
study of apologia as a particular kind of communicative 
response. Rhetoric is shaped by prior rhetoric, by verbal 
conventions in a culture, and by past ideas and issues. By 
further developing theory of the rhetorical process, we can 
generate concepts on how we and others can more effectively 
communicate, understand, and perhaps even influence 
political discourse in the future. 
Ronald Reagan, whether we admired him or not, proved 
himself to be "the great communicator" because he told his 
story the way the American people wanted to hear it; and he 
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Appendix A 
Chronology of the Iran-contra Affair 
Following is a chronology of major events in the Iran-
Contra Affair, based on reports from the House and Senate 
Select Committees formed to investigate the Iran-Contra 
Affair, and the Tower Commission, whose role was to 









Spring 1 84 
u.s. imposes embargo on arms shipments to 
Iran. 
President signs finding authorizing covert 
aid intended to pressure the Sandinistas to 
negotiate a treaty with nearby countries. 
Bombing of u.s. Marine barracks in Beirut, 
killing 241 Marines. 
$24-million cap on Contra funding imposed by 
Congress. 
u.s. begins "Operation Staunch," urging 
allied governments to "stop transferring arms 
to Iran." 
u.s. government officially lists Iran as a 
sponsor of international terrorism. 
Disclosure of mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 
Public criticism of u.s. involvement 
undermines congressional support for 
assistance to the Contras. 
McFarlane meets with Ambassador of "Country 
Two," who agrees to provide $1 million per 
month as contribution to the Contras. 
According to North, he and Casey first 
discuss the "fall-guy plan," to provide 
"plausible deniability" to North's superiors. 
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6/25/84 National Security Planning Group (NSPG) 
meeting to consider options for funding 
Contra (President, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, 
casey, Meese, McFarlane present). Casey 
urges President to seek third-country 
funding. Shultz quotes Jim Baker that 
such would be an impeachable offense. Meese 
recalls William French Smith opinion 
providing authority for such. No decision 
made. Neither President nor McFarlane 
reveals County Two contribution already 
agreed to. 
Summer 1 84 At Casey's suggestion, according to North, 
North recruited retired Air Force Major 
General Richard Secord, operator of the 
"Enterprise," to assist in buying weapons for 
the Contras with the third-country funds 
being received. 
8/31/84 National Security advisor Robert McFarlane 
formally requests government agencies to 
reassess and analyze u.s. policy toward Iran. 
9/2/84 National Security staff member Lt. Col. 
Oliver North suggests to McFarlane that a 
private donor be found to give a helicopter 
to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels. It is an 
early indication of the NSC's interest in 
soliciting private aid for the Contras. u.s. 
military assistance to the Contras was barred 
by the so-called Boland Amendment enacted in 
1982. 
10/12/84 Boland II becomes law. 
2/85 Country Two agrees to contribute additional 
$24 million. President informed by head of 
state. 
Spring 1 85 First two arms shipments arranged by Secord 
and North reach Contras. 
4/18/85 Lt. Col. North, according to the commission, 
sketches a diagram proposing how money from 
private donors might be channeled to the 
contras under a program he dubs "Project 
Democracy." 
4/23/85 House rejects administration's Contra-aid 
request. 
5/1/85 President announces imposition of economic 
sanctions against Nicaragua. 
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5/3/85 Michael Ledeen, an NSC consultant, (with 
McFarlane's approval) meets with Israeli 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres and expresses 
interest in sharing intelligence on Iran. 
Peres asks Ledeen if the u.s. would approve a 
shipment of arms to Iran. Ledeen agrees on 
behalf of McFarlane. Hostages discussed, 
according to Israelis. 
6/19/85 Ghorbanifar, Iranian arms dealer and 
businessman, and Furmark, New York 
businessman, meet Israelis in Israel to 
propose sale of 100 TOWs to Iran. 
Ghorbanifar agrees to set up meeting with 
Iranian official. 
7/3/85 David Kimchee, Director General of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, tells McFarlane 
that Iran wants to open a "political 
discourse" with the u.s. 
7/8/85 President's speech to American Bar 
Association. Calls Iran part of 
"confederation of terrorist states • • • a 
new international version of Murder Inc. 
America will never make concessions to 
terrorists." Refers to Iran, Libya, North 
Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua as "outlaw states 
run by the strangest collection of misfits, 
Looney Tunes and squalid criminals since the 
advent of the Third Reich." 
7/8/85 Israelis meet in Hamburg with Ghorbanifar, 
Khashoggi, Saudi Arabian businessman, and 
Iranian representative to discuss sale of 100 
TOWs, with sale to be followed by release of 
the American hostages. 
7/8/85 John Singlaub's (retired u.s. Army Major 
General) arms shipment received by Contras. 
Last arms shipment by dealer other than 
Secord, and last time funds were handled by 
Adolfo Calero, political director of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force, rather than by 
the "Enterprise." 
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7/18/85 President Reagan, recuperating in a hospital 
from cancer surgery, authorizes McFarlane to 
make contact with Iran through the Israelis. 
McFarlane later says the President was "all 
for letting the Israelis do anything they 
wanted" in dealing with Iran. 
Late July 1 85 Ledeen meets in Israel with Iranian-born arms 
dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, who says Iran 
might arrange to release u.s. hostages if the 
u.s. helps Iran obtain weapons. 
8/2/85 Kimchee meets with McFarlane in Washington to 
seek explicit u.s. position on sale of 100 
TOWs. McFarlane agrees to present issue to 
the President. 
8/6/85 Meeting with the President, McFarlane, Bush, 
Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan. Permission 
for the sale of 100 TOWs to Iran by Israel is 
discussed. Shultz and Weinberger opposed. 
McFarlane testified that the President called 
him several days later and authorized the 
Israelis to proceed. (The President told the 
Tower Board that he had authorized the sale, 
then said that he had not authorized the 
sale, and finally said that he had no 
recollection one way or the other.) 
8/8/85 President signs bill authorizing $27 million 
in humanitarian assistance to the Contras. 
8/10/85 North meets with Castillo, pseudonym for the 
CIA station chief in Costa Rica, and Tambs, 
Ambassador to Costa Rica, in Costa Rica to 
discuss establishment of secret air base for 
resupply of Contras in Nicaragua. 
8/20/85 96 TOWs delivered by Israel to Iran. It is 
the first of at least eight separate arms 
shipments over the next 14 months. No 
hostages are released. 
Fall '85 North meets with representative of Country 
Three at Hay-Adams Hotel to request funds for 
Contras. Country Three eventually donates $2 
million. 
9/4-5/85 Ledeen meets in Paris with Israelis and 
Ghorbanifar. Ghorbanifar indicates that one 
hostage will be released in exchange for an 
additional 400 TOW missiles. 
89 
9/15/85 Israel delivers 408 missiles to Iran. 
McFarlane is given the choice of the release 
of any hostage other than Buckley. That same 
day Rev. Benjamin Weir becomes the first u.s. 
hostage to be released by pro-Iranian Shiite 
militiamen in Lebanon. Two more hostages are 
released over the next year. 
10/10/85 White House spokesman Speakes reading 
statement following capture of hijackers of 
the Achille Lauro: "From the outset the 
United States Government made • . . clear to 
all the governments involved our firm 
opposition with negotiations with terrorists 
or concessions to them." 
11/15/85 McFarlane meets with Israeli Defense Minister 
Rabin at White House and conveys President's 
authorization for further arms sale, with 
u.s. replenishment of Israeli stocks. 
11/17/85 McFarlane informs President about shipment of 
80 HAWKs just before they leave for summit 
meeting in Geneva. 
11/18/85 Problem develops with flight clearances for 
shipment of HAWKs to Iran, and North recruits 
Secord to go to Europe to resolve it. 
11/22/85 The Central Intelligence Agency arranges for 
the shipment of HAWK antiaircraft missiles 
from Israel to Iran. 
11/24-25/85 First 19 HAWK missiles delivered by CIA plane 
from Israel to Teheran. Remaining HAWKs 
rejected by Iran as obsolete. No hostages 
released. 
11/25/85 John McMahon, CIA Deputy Director, declares 
that the CIA will not provide any more covert 
assistance unless President Reagan explicitly 
authorizes such operations. 
11/30/85 McFarlane resigns as National Security 
Adviser. 
12/4 85 Vice Admiral John Poindexter succeeds 
McFarlane as National Security Adviser. 
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12/5/85 In one of his first acts as National Security 
Adviser, Poindexter presents finding to 
President, who signs it. Regan, present at 
the briefing, has no memory of President's 
signing it.) Finding retroactively 
authorizes HAWK shipment and indicates 
exchange for hostages. 
12/6/85 North tells Israeli officials at meeting in 
New York that u.s. wants to use profits from 
upcoming arms sale to Iran to fund activity 
in Nicaragua (according to Israeli Historical 
Chronology submitted to the Committee). 
12/7/85 President Reagan holds a meeting in his 
office with Bush, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, 
McFarlane, Poindexter, John McMahon, and 
Regan. Strong opposition to arms sale 
expressed by Shultz and Weinberger. 
President Reagan later says he recalls 
discussing a complex Iranian proposal for 
release of hostages keyed to arms shipments 
in installments from the Israelis. 
12/8/85 McFarlane meets in London with Kimche, 
Secord, North, Nimrodi, former Israeli 
defense official and arms dealer, and 
Ghorbanifar. McFarlane is unhappy with 
Ghorbanifar•s arms-for-hostage approach. 
North id unhappy with McFarlane's negative 
reaction, raises specter of hostage deaths if 
plan doesn't go forward. 
12/9/85 North submits to Poindexter a memo proposing 
a direct arms-for-hostages exchange, to be 
handled by Secord, a North associate who is 
also believed to have been running a private 
supply network for the Contras, and 
Ghorbanifar. North, Ghorbanifar, Ledeen, 
Secord, new Israeli antiterrorist advisor 
Amiram Nir--who had taken Kimchee•s place--
jointly work out an arms-for-hostages plan 
over the next few weeks. It is not known who 
took the lead. 
12/12/85 Poindexter visits Central America. 
12/13/85 on return from Central America, Poindexter 
briefs President on secret airstrip in Costa 
Rica. 
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1/2/86 Nir meets with Poindexter and North in 
Washington to propose new arms sale involving 
4,000 TOWs, the release of all American 
hostages and 20-30 Hizballah prisoners held 
by the Southern Lebanon Army. 
1/3/86 North and Sporkin, CIA General Counsel, meet 
to draft new finding to authorize CIA 
participation in new arms sales (and 
inclusion of "third parties" in draft North 
prepared). 
1/6/86 President Reagan signs a "finding," or order, 
authorizing covert action including arms 
shipments to Iran to help secure the release 
of American hostages. Reagan late tells the 
Commission he does not recall signing the 
finding; Chief of Staff Regan tells the 
Commission the order "may have been signed in 
error." 
1/7/86 At National Security Council meeting, with 
President, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Meese, 
Casey, Poindexter, and Regan present, 
Weinberger and Shultz object strenuously. 
President's signing of the finding the 
previous day is not mentioned. 
1/15/86 North gives National Security Agency--
provided KL-43 encryption devices to key 
members of the Contra resupply operation. 
This equipment and accompanying classified 
codes allowed secure communications among 
North, Secord, and others over open telephone 
lines. 
1/17/86 Reagan signs a second finding authorizing 
arms shipments, with language only slightly 
revised from that of the first (insertion of 
the words "third parties," thereby allowing 
for the use of the "Enterprise"). 
1/22/86 North, Secord, and Nir meet with Ghorbanifar 
in London. Ghorbanifar, according to North 
testimony, suggests diversion in bathroom 
meeting. At London meeting, delivery 
schedule for 1,000 TOW missiles agreed upon. 
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Early Feb.'86 By this time, according to the Commission, 
the CIA had begun acquiring weapons for Iran 
and had designated a Swiss bank account for 
the proceeds of the sales. The agency had 
also put two airplanes "at the disposal of 
General Secord." 
2/17/86 First 500 TOWs shipped, returning with 17 
rejected HAWKs from November 1985 shipment. 
2/25/86 North, Secord, and Ghorbanifar meet with 
Iranian official in Frankfurt. Albert Hakim 
(Secord's business partner in the 
"Enterprise"), under disguise, serves as 
translator. Eventually agreement reached 
that sale of 1,000 missiles will lead to 
release of "a couple of hostages." 
2/27/86 Second load of 500 TOWs delivered to Iran. 
No hostages released. 
3/7/86 North, George Cave (retired CIA officer), 
Ghorbanifar, and Nir meet in"Paris. 
Ghorbanifar indicates that Iranians are not 
interested in additional TOWs, but seek 240 
HAWK spare parts. 
4/1/86 First air resupply to the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force (FDN) accomplished. 
4/4/86 North writes memorandum for Poindexter to 
present to President Reagan saying $12 
million from the Iranian arms sales "will be 
used to purchase critically needed supplies" 
for the Nicaraguan Contra. However, the 
Commission says it has no evidence that 
Reagan saw the memo. 
4/11/86 First successful air resupply mission into 
southern Nicaragua accomplished. 
4/20/86 North and Secord meet at the air base in 
Central America with James J. Steele, Felix 
Rodriguez (alias "Max Gomez," former CIA 
operative recruited by North for resupply 
operation in Central America), and the 
military leadership of the FDN. Complaints 
about the age and reliability of the 
aircraft expressed. 
5/1/86 Rodriguez meets with Bush. Scheduling memo 
states: "To brief the Vice President on the 
status of the war in [a Central American 
country) and resupply of the contras." 
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5/6/86 North, Nir, cave, and Ghorbanifar meet in 
London to discuss pricing of spare-parts 
shipment. Agreement that HAWK parts would be 
brought on a plane with McFarlane for meeting 
with high Iranian officials in Teheran. 
Remainder of HAWK parts would be delivered 
after release of hostages took place. 
5/15/86 President Reagan approves a mission to 
Teheran by McFarlane. The same day, 
Poindexter tells North to "generate a cover 
story" to conceal his heavy involvement with 
unauthorized Contra supply operations. The 
next day North sends a note to Poindexter 
saying the clandestine arms shipments 
"could well become a political embarrassment 
for the President." North has "no idea" what 
Chief of Staff Regan "does or does not know," 
North writes, but the President "obviously 
knows why he has been meeting with several 
select people to thank them" for providing 
donations to the Contras. 
5/16/86 National Security Planning Group {NSPG) 
meeting with the President to discuss third-
country humanitarian assistance. Shultz 
instructed to prepare list of potential 
third-county donors. No one mentions Country 
Two and Country Three funds already received 
by the Contras. 
5/25/86 McFarlane, North and other u.s. officials 
travel to Teheran to meet with Iranian 
officials. Poindexter has rejected North's 
request for a prior meeting with the 
President and other cabinet officers because 
of potential objections from Shultz and 
Weinberger. The u.s. entourage shares the 
plane with a shipment of missile parts for 
Iran. 
5/28/86 McFarlane breaks off Teheran negotiations and 
party leaves Teheran without the release of 
hostages, having delivered one pallet of HAWK 
parts. 
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6/6/86 President Reagan approves military planning 
to rescue the hostages. North told 
Poindexter in February that the NSC staff was 
drawing up plans. 
6/16/86 Shultz first learns of Country Two 
solicitation from McFarlane. 
6/25/86 House approves $100 million for Contras. 
7/4/86 Israelis and Ghorbanifar fail in effort to 
convince Iranians to arrange release of 
hostage in time for Statue of Liberty 
celebration. 
7/26/86 Father Jenco is released, as arranged 
by Ghorbanifar and Israelis. 
7/29/86 North memo to Poindexter predicts hostage 
will be killed if HAWK parts not delivered to 
Iran. 
7/30/86 Poindexter indicates President approved 
shipment of HAWK parts. 
8/8/86 240 HAWK missile parts shipped to Iran. 
8/8/86 North, Ghorbanifar, and Nir meet in London to 
discuss continued initiative. North agrees 
to sequential deliveries of arms and 
hostages, subject to ratification by 
administration. 
8/8/86 Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs, meets Brunei 
representative in London and solicits $10 
million. Funds never reach Contras: North or 
Fawn Hall, secretary to North, transposes 
account number given to Brunei by Abrams. 
8/8/86 Rodriguez meets with Donald T. Gregg, Bush's 
National Security Adviser and former CIA 
official, and voices allegations about Secord 
group overpricing, Edwin Wilson connections, 
etc. Rodriguez makes clear to Gregg 
(reflected in his notes) that North is 
involved. Gregg testified that he never told 
Bush this. 
8/25/86 Secord and Hakim meet with the "Second 
Channel" in Brussels. 
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9/9/86 Another American, Frank Reed, Director of the 
Lebanese International School, is taken 
hostage in West Beirut. 
9/9/86 North calls Costa Rican President Oscar Arias 
Sanchez and threatens to "withhold u.s. 
assistance" if Arias shuts down an airstrip 
used by the Contras. 
9/12/86 Joseph Cicippio, Chief Accountant at the 
American University, is abducted in West 
Beirut, raising the number of American 
hostages in Lebanon to five. 
9/12/86 Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin offers 
"a significant quantity of captured Soviet 
bloc arms" for use by the Contras. 
Poindexter discusses the offer prior to a 
meeting between Reagan and Israeli Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres Sept. 15. 
9/15/86 North arranges for a Danish ship to pick up 
weapons in Israel and deliver them to the 
Contras. 
9/19-20/86 Meeting in Washington with Iranians from 
Second Channel. Iranians tour White House 
with North. 
9/25/86 Costa Rican officials hold press conference 
announcing discovery of secret airstrip in 
Costa Rica. 
10/5/86 A cargo plane carrying arms to the Contras is 
shot down over Nicaragua and a crewman, 
Eugene Hasenfus, is captured. The u.s. 
denies any connection to the operation, but 
North Oct. 12 tells McFarlane that "we 
urgently need to find a high-powered lawyer 
and benefactor" for Hasenfus. 
10/6-8/86 Meetings with Second Channel in Frankfurt. 
North leaves Hakim to negotiate with the 
Iranians. Agreement reached on nine-point 
so-called Hakim Accords. 
10/7/86 Casey is informed by Roy Furmark, a business 
associate of Khashoggi, one of the principal 
financiers of the arms sales, that investors 
in the arms sales and Ghorbanifar are upset 
and threatening to go public. 
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10/13/86 According to North, Casey tells him sometime 
between October 13 and November 4, 1986: 
" . . . this whole thing was coming 
unravelled and that things ought to be 
'cleaned up.'" North testified that in 
response to this instruction he began 
shredding documents. 
10/28/86 500 TOWs delivered to Iran under the "nine-
point plan." This is apparently the last 
arms shipment. 
10/29/86 North, Hakim, Cave, and Secord meet with 
Second Channel in Mainz, Germany, to discuss 
release of one or two hostages and completion 
of nine-point plan. 
11/2/86 David Jacobsen is released. 
11/3/86 Al-Shiraa, Lebanese newspaper, reports u.s. 
had sold arms to Iran. 
11/86 According to North, shortly after disclosure 
of the arms sales, he and Casey discuss 
implementing the "fall-guy plan." According 
to North, Casey tells him that he (North) 
might not be "big enough" to be the "fall 
guy" and indicates that "it's probably going 
to go higher." Casey suggests: "Poindexter 
might have to be a fall guy." 
11/6/86 Reagan, in his first public statement on the 
subject of the reports of u.s. arms sales 
to Iran, states they have "no foundation." 
11/13/86 In a television address to the nation, 
President Reagan acknowledged that the u.s. 
had sent "less than a planeload" of weapons 
to Iran. He also stated, "We did not--
repeat--not trade weapons or anything else 
for hostages nor will we." 
11/18-19/86 McFarlane and North prepare a chronology of 
the arms sales for Reagan's reference that 
obscures the President's approval of the 
first shipment. 
11/19/86 President denies third-country involvement in 
arms sales, asserts u.s. involvement only 
after January 17 finding, asserts that only 
1,000 TOWs were shipped, and that everything 
"sold could be put in one cargo plane." 
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11/20/86 Shultz meets with President to inform him of 
misstatements at press conference and that he 
was receiving misinformation from 
subordinates. Shultz testified, "Not the 
kind of discussion I ever thought I would 
have with the President of the United 
States." 
11/20/86 Meeting held in Poindexter's office to review 
Casey statement prepared for testimony before 
the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
on November 21. Casey, Meese, Poindexter, 
North, Cooper (Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel), Thompson (National 
Security Council Counsel), and Gates (CIA 
Deputy Director) attend. At North's 
suggestion, statement is changed to say "no 
one in the u.s. Government" knew at the time 
that the November 1985 shipment contained 
arms. The "oil drilling equipment" story 
agreed to at the meeting was false, as North 
admitted in his testimony. It was removed 
from Casey's testimony at the insistence of 
State Department Legal Adviser Abraham 
Sofaer. 
11/21/86 President authorizes Meese to commence an 
inquiry into the arms-sales matter. 
11/21/86 North instructs Fawn Hall to alter series of 
documents. North, Earl (Deputy to North), 
and Hall shred documents. 
11/21/86 Poindexter tells North that the President was 
never told of the diversion of Iran arms-
sales funds to the Contras. 
11/21/86 Casey and Poindexter appear before the 
Intelligence Committees. Poindexter tells 
the Committees that the u.s. had disapproved 
of the Israeli arms shipments to Iran and 
that until the day before (11/20) he had 
believed that administration officials did 
not know of them until after they had 
occurred. 
11/21/86 Poindexter destroys December 1985 retroactive 
presidential finding. 
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11/22/86 Diversion memo discovered by Reynolds 
(Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division) and Richardson (Meese's Chief of 
Staff). Meese is told at lunch at Old Ebbitt 
Grill. 
11/22/86 Casey and Poindexter have lunch for two and a 
half hours. Poindexter testified that he 
remembers nothing about what was discussed. 
11/22/86 Meese meets with Casey at Casey's home (6:00 
P.M.). According to Meese's later testimony, 
he does not ask about diversion. 
11/23/86 Meese interviews North. North conceals 
existence of the "Enterprise"--Secord's 
companies and Swiss bank accounts-- telling 
Meese that funds went directly from Israelis 
to Calero's accounts. 
11/23/86 Later that evening North shreds additional 
documents at his office, working until at 
least 4:15 A.M. 
11/25/86 Meese press conference revealing diversion of 
funds from arms sales to Iran to Contras. 
11/25/86 National Security Council security officer 
secures North's office. 
11/25/86 Fawn Hall smuggles documents out of North's 
office. 
11/25/86 Reagan accepts Poindexter's resignation and 
fires North after it is revealed that profits 
from the arms sales to Iran have been 
diverted to the Contras. 
11/26/86 President Reagan appoints the Tower 
Commission to review the operation of the NSC 
and recommend corrective action. 
12/1/86 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
begins preliminary inquiry. 
12/2/86 Frank Carlucci is named National Security 
Adviser to replace Poindexter. 
12/4/86 House and Senate leaders agree to form 
separate Watergate-style select committees to 
investigate the scandal, with work expected 
to begin in January. 
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12/6/86 Reagan in his weekly radio address 
acknowledges for the first time that 
"mistakes were made" in the plan to sell 
weapons to Iran and funnel profits to the 
Contras. He says the errors occurred only in 
the execution of policy, not "in the 
policies themselves." 
12/8/86 Shultz testifies before House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, distancing himself again from the 
administration's actions concerning arms 
sales to Iran and the channeling of funds to 
the Contras. McFarlane testifies before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee that North 
informed him in May that "the u.s. Government 
had applied part of the proceeds" from the 
sale of arms to Iran "to support the 
Contras." His testimony contradicts 
statements by Reagan and Meese that the u.s. 
was not involved in any transfer of funds to 
the rebels. 
12/10/86 Casey testified before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that on Oct. 7, 1986 he was 
told by New York businessman Roy Furmark, a 
former legal client, about "the whole 
operation" involving arms to Iran and the 
possibility that "some of the money may have 
been diverted for other purposes." However, 
Casey claimed he had no knowledge of the 
diversion of funds to the Contras and 
repeatedly professed ignorance about CIA cash 
transactions involving Swiss bank accounts. 
He said the first official information he 
received cane from Meese on or shortly before 
November 25. 
12/10/86 Poindexter refuses to testify during a 10-
minute appearance before the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. 
12/10/86 Swiss officials reported the u.s. failed to 
provide documentation to back up its request 
to freeze two bank accounts. As a result, 
one account effectively remains open to 
further transactions. Legal experts 
expressed surprise at the u.s. delay, one 
Swiss official hypothesizing that perhaps 
"the Americans don't really want us to block 
the accounts at all." 
12/13/86 Meeting with Second Channel in Frankfurt. 
This is first meeting at which State 
Department is represented. As a result 
Shultz learns of the nine-point plan. 
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12/14/86 Shultz reports nine-point plan to the 
President. Shultz testified that the 
President was "stunned and furious." 
Poindexter testified that the President had 
approved the plan. 
12/15/86 CIA Director Casey suffers arm and leg 
seizures and is admitted to Georgetown 
University Hospital where he is diagnosed as 
having lymphoma, a rare form of brain cancer. 
He is scheduled to testify before Congress 
the next day. 
12/15/86 Regan testifies in closed session before the 
Senate Intelligence Committee. He said 
neither he nor Reagan had any prior knowledge 
of funds being diverted to the Contras, and 
that the President authorized the Israeli 
arms shipment after the fact. 
12/15/86 Swiss officials said they had received an 
expanded request from the u.s. government 
requesting that all accounts associated with 
North and two others be frozen. On the basis 
of the request the Swiss government asked the 
Credit Suisse bank to block the appropriate 
accounts, and Credit suisse complied, 
announcing that at least two accounts 
had been frozen. 
12/15/86 Eugene Hasenfus, who had begun serving a 30-
year sentence for transporting arms to 
Nicaragua, was pardoned by Daniel Ortega and 
released to visiting Senator Christopher 
Dodd. 
12/19/86 Lawrence E. Walsh is named Independent 
Counsel with authority to investigate the 
Iran arms sales, the diversion of funds to 
"any foreign country, including, but limited 
to Nicaragua," and "the Provision or 
coordination of support for persons 
or entities engaged as military insurgents in 
armed conflict with the Government of 
Nicaragua since 1984." 
101 
12/26/86 David Abshire, outgoing NATO Ambassador, is 
appointed by Reagan to "coordinate White 
House activities in all aspects of the Iran 
matter," effective January 5, 1.987. 
1/6/87 Senate Select Committee created. 
1/7/87 House Select Committee created. 
1/24/87 The Army admits it undercharged the CIA $2.5 
million for 2,008 TOW antitank missile parts 
sent to Iran last year. Although the 
discrepancy was "an honest mistake," 
according to report, the administration, as a 
consequence, did not have to report the sale 
to Congress because it fell below the $14 
million cut-off for notification. 
1/24/87 Three hostages kidnapped in Lebanon (Alann 
Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill). 
1/26/87 Reagan meets for 76 minutes with members of 
the Tower Commission. This is the first 
discussion of the controversy the President 
had held with any group other than his staff. 
1/27/87 In his State of the Union address, Reagan 
acknowledged that "serious mistakes were 
made" in the program of selling arms to Iran, 
but does not disavow the policy itself. He 
also stood firmly behind the policy of aid to 
the Contras. 
1/29/87 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
issues report on preliminary inquiry. 
2/2/87 Casey resigns as Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
2/9/87 McFarlane takes an overdose of 20 to 30 
Valium pills. Police officials, calling it a 
suicide attempt, said he wrote a note 
relating to the incident. Friends attribute 
his action to failing to live up to his own 
standards rather than fear of pending 
investigations. McFarlane was to testify 
before the Tower Commission the next day. 
He said later he tried to kill himself 
because he "failed the country." 
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2/26/87 The President's Special Review Board, known 
as the Tower Commission, released its report. 
This special commission created by President 
Reagan interviewed many of the participants 
and gathered most of the significant 
documents. The report, at the time the Iran-
Contra Committee began its investigation, 
provided the basis for most of what was then 
known about the affair. 
2/27/87 Reagan meets with Howard Baker to discuss 
Baker's taking over as White House Chief of 
Staff. After the 20 minute session, Baker 
accepts. Informed of the move, Regan 
immediately has a one-sentence letter of 
resignation typed out. 
3/4/87 President's oval Office Speech on Iran. 
4/29/87 Carl Channell, private fund-raise for the 
Contras, pleads guilty to conspiracy and tax 
fraud, naming North and Richard R. Miller as 
co-conspirators. 
5/5-8/87 House and Senate Committees investigating the 
Iran-Contra arms scandal opened their joint 
public hearings. 
5/6/87 Miller pleads guilty to conspiracy and tax 
fraud. 
5/6/87 Former CIA Director Casey dies of pneumonia. 
Because of his illness, which followed 
surgery to excise a brain tumor in 1986, 
Casey had not been expected to testify at the 
hearings. 
5/11-14/87 Former White House National Security Adviser 
McFarlane testifies voluntarily. However, a 
combination of incomplete or evasive answers 
left specific details about Reagan's role 
still unclear. 
5/14-19/98 Robert Owen, messenger between Contra leaders 
and North, testified before the Committees 
under a grant of immunity. Calling North the 
Contras' "quartermaster," Owen testified that 
he had delivered envelope full of cash from 
North's office safe to Contra leaders in 
Washington and Central America in 1984-85, at 
a time when a Congressional ban on u.s. aid 
to the Contras were in effect. owen's 
testimony was the most explicit to date in 
specifying the direct role North played 
in keeping the Contras funded. 
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5/15/87 After months of denying that he knew 
specifics about private aid to the Contras, 
Reagan tells a group of Southern journalists 
that he had been regularly briefed on Contra 
aid because it was "my idea to begin with." 
5/19/87 Adolfo Calero, head of largest Contra 
faction, appears before the Joint 
Congressional Committee. His testimony 
focuses largely on allegations that 
North had used about $2,000 in traveler's 
checks from Contra funds for apparently 
personal expenses, including snow tires and 
women's stockings. Despite the relatively 
small sums involved, the suggestion that 
North might have personally profited from the 
Contras overshadowed Calero's other 
statements. He revealed that he had worked 
closely with the CIA. 
5/20-21/87 Singlaub takes the stand at the Congressional 
hearings. He claims that Assistant Secretary 
of State Elliott Abrams had agreed to assure 
two foreign governments--identified elsewhere 
as Taiwan and South Korea--that Singlaub had 
the administration's approval in soliciting 
aid from them for the Contras. The 
Committees then hear testimony from three 
wealthy donors to Contra causes: Joseph Coors 
Co.; Ellen st. John Garwood, an elderly 
heiress to the Anderson, Clayton & Co. 
fortune; and William O'Boyle, heir to a Texas 
oil fortune. Garwood and O'Boyle described 
meeting with North and fund-raiser Carl 
Channell to solicit money directly. 
According to Garwood, Channell 
promised that, for $300,000, the donor would 
get a private, 15-minute meeting with 
President Reagan. 
6/2-3/87 Elliott Abrams appears before the 
Congressional Committees. His testimony 
focuses almost entirely on whether he had 
intentionally deceived the Senate 
Intelligence Committee Nov. 25, 1986, just 
as the scandal broke. He admits that he had 
left a misleading impression with the 
committee, but insists that his statements 
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head been technically correct and that he had 
not intentionally deceived the senators. He 
also contradicts testimony given by Singlaub, 
saying that he had not met with Sing1aub 
before the general's trip to Asia. 
6/3-4/87 Testifying under a grant of limited immunity, 
Albert Hakim, Secord's business partner, 
appeared before the committees. Considered 
the person most familiar with the intricate 
financial arrangements behind the scandal, 
Hakim detailed for the committees the 
disposition of some of the profits 
left over from the sale of u.s. arms to Iran 
--those that were not diverted to the 
Contras. Hakim said that the structure of 
front corporations and numbered bank accounts 
had become so intricate that even he, who had 
set it up, was often confused. The payment 
that attracted the most attention was 
$200,000 in an account that Hakim said was 
set up for North's family shortly before 
North travelled to Teheran on a secret, 
unsuccessful mission to rescue u.s. hostages 
held in Lebanon. Hakim himself made no 
secret of the fact that he was motivated by 
profit. 
6/8/87 Bretton Sciaroni, counsel to the President's 
Intelligence oversight Board, testifies 
before the Congressional Committees. 
Sciaroni had written the legal opinion cited 
by White House officials, including President 
Reagan, to support their claim that the 
Boland amendment banning covert aid to 
the Contras did not apply to the NSC. The 
questions focused on his qualifications as a 
lawyer and the thoroughness of his 
investigation of Boland. Sciaroni admits 
that he had failed the California bar exam 
twice and the District of Columbia exam twice 
before passing the bar in Pennsylvania, where 
he had never lived or worked. He also 
acknowledges that his 1985 legal opinion, 
his first such project as attorney, was based 
on brief talks with North and NSC lawyer 
Cmdr. Paul Thompson, and on quick review of 
documents that Thompson said were sufficient. 
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6/8-9/87 Fawn Hall testifies before the Congressional 
Committees. She offers few new details about 
her role in the scandal. Hall defends her 
actions in altering, shredding, and smuggling 
out certain documents. "Sometimes you have 
to go above the written law," she said. 
7/7-14/87 Lt. Col. Oliver North begins his long-awaited 
testimony before the House and Senate 
Committees, saying that he believes that all 
his activities as a member of the NSC staff 
from 1981 through 1986 had been authorized by 
his superiors. He admits deceiving Congress 
and misusing some funds from the sale of arms 
to Iran, but he cites national security and 
the safety of his family to justify those 
actions. North, testifying under a grant of 
immunity and under a complex agreement worked 
out with the committees, says that he never 
"personally discussed" the diversion of funds 
with Reagan, but had "assumed that the 
President was aware of what I was doing and 
had, through my superiors, approved it." 
7/15-21/87 Rear Adm. John Poindexter tells Congressional 
panel that he never told the President about 
the diversion of funds from arms transactions 
with Iran to the Contra rebels fighting the 
Nicaraguan government. Poindexter says that 
he had authorized the controversial diversion 
and deliberately kept Reagan in the dark in 
order to "provide some future deniability for 
the President if it ever leaked out." 
7/23-24/87 Secretary of State George Shultz testifies 
before the Congressional Committees that his 
strong opposition to the secret arms sales to 
Iran had sparked a "battle royal" and 
"guerilla warfare" within the White House. 
He angrily testifies that Poindexter, 
McFarlane and Casey had lied to him and 
withheld information from President Reagan in 
order to continue the Iranian initiative and 
ultimately protect themselves. Shultz denies 
charges that he had deliberately kept himself 
uninformed about details of the Iran 
operation and the covert effort to resupply 
the Contras, and then tried to distance 
himself from the policies once the scandal 
broke. He says he had argued strenuously 
against the arms sales and worked to try to 
end them from the inside. 
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7/28-29/87 Attorney General Edwin Meese defends his own 
brief probe of the Iran arms affair, telling 
the committees that funds from the arms sales 
to Iran had been diverted to the Contras, but 
admits that he had failed to ask some 
critical questions of key participants. 
7/30-31/87 Former White House Chief of staff Donald 
Regan testifies that when no hostages were 
released following a February 1986 shipment 
of arms to Iran, Reagan felt that "we'd been 
had." 
7/31-8/3/87 Secretary of Defense Weinberger testifies 
before the Congressional panels that he had 
repeatedly tried to stop the arms sales to 
Iran and that he thought he had succeeded 
each time, only to discover that White House 
officials had deceived him in order to keep 
the operation going. 
8/3/87 Joint Congressional Committees conclude the 
public segment of their hearings. 
8/12/87 Responding to the recently concluded 
congressional hearings in a nationally 
broadcast address, President Reagan stated, 
"Our original initiative got all tangled up 
in the sale of arms, and the sale of arms got 
tangled up with the hostages. • • • I let my 
preoccupation with the hostages intrude into 
areas where it didn't belong." 
11/17/87 The Joint Congressional Committees 
investigating the Iran-Contra arms scandal 
submit their final report. 
3/11/88 McFarlane pleads guilty to four counts of 
withholding information from Congress. 
3/16/88 Indictments returned against North, 
Poindexter, Hakim, and Secord. 
APPENDIX B 
PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE TOWER COMMISSSION REPORT 
Appendix B 
President's response to the Tower Commission Report 
Carried on network television March 4, 1987 
My fellow Americans, I've spoken to you from this 
historic office on many occasions and about many things. 
The power of the Presidency is often thought to reside 
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within this Oval Office. Yet it doesn't rest here; it rests 
in you, the American people, and in your trust. 
Your trust is what gives a President his powers of 
leadership and his personal strength, and it's what I want 
to talk to you about this evening. 
For the past three months, I've been sitting silent on 
the revelations about Iran. You must have been thinking, 
"Well, why doesn't he tell us what's happening? Why doesn't 
he just speak to us as he has in the past when we've faced 
troubles or tragedies?" Others of you, I guess, were 
thinking, "What is he doing hiding out in the White House?" 
The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is this: 
You deserved the truth. And, as frustrating as the waiting 
has been, I felt it was improper to come to you with sketchy 
reports, or possibly even erroneous statements, which would 
then have to be corrected, creating even more doubt and 
confusion. There's been enough of that. 
I've paid a price for my silence in terms of your trust 
and confidence. But I have had to wait, as have you, for 
the complete story. 
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That's why I appointed Ambassador David Abshire as my 
special counselor to help get out the thousands of documents 
to the various investigations. And I appointed a special 
review board, the Tower board, which took on the chore of 
pulling the truth together for me and getting to the bottom 
of things. It has now issued its findings. 
I'm often accused of being an optimist, and it's true I 
had to hunt pretty hard to find any good news in the board's 
report. As you know, it's well-stocked with criticisms, 
which I'll discuss in a moment, but I was very relieved to 
read this sentence, "· .. The board is convinced that the 
President does indeed want the full story to be told." 
And that will continue to be my pledge to you as the 
other investigations go forward. 
I want to thank the members of the panel--former 
Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, 
and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. They 
have done the nation, as well as me personally, a great 
service by submitting a report of such integrity and depth. 
They have my genuine and enduring gratitude. 
I've studied the board's report. Its findings are 
honest, convincing and highly critical, and I accept them. 
And tonight I want to share with you my thoughts on these 
findings and report to you on the actions I'm taking to 
implement the board's recommendations. 
First, let me say I take full responsibility for my own 
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actions and for those of my Administration. As angry as I 
may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I 
am still accountable for those activities. As disappointed 
as I may be in some who served me, I am still the one who 
must answer to the American people for this behavior. And 
as personally distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and 
diverted funds, well, as the Navy would say, this happened 
on my watch. 
Let's start with the part that is the most 
controversial. A few months ago I told the American people 
I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best 
intentions still tell me that is true, but the facts and the 
evidence tell me it is not. 
As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic 
opening to Iran deteriorated in its implementation into 
trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own 
beliefs, to Administration policy and to the original 
strategy we had in mind. There are reasons why it happened 
but no excuses. It was a mistake. 
I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to 
develop relations with those who might assume leadership in 
a post-Khomeini Government. It's clear from the board's 
report, however, that I let my personal concern for the 
hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of 
reaching out to Iran. I asked so many questions about the 
hostages' welfare that I didn't ask enough about the 
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specifics of the total Iran plan. 
Let me say to the hostage families, we have not given 
up. We never will, and I promise you we'll use every 
legitimate means to free your loved ones from captivity. 
But I must also caution that those Americans who freely 
remain in such dangerous areas must know that they're 
responsible for their own safety. 
Now, another major aspect of the Board's findings 
regards the transfer of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. 
The Tower board wasn't able to find out what happened to 
this money, so the facts here will be left to the continuing 
investigations of the court-appointed independent counsel 
and the two Congressional investigating committees. I'm 
confident the truth will come out about this matter as well. 
As I told the Tower board, I didn't know about any 
diversion of funds to the contras. But as President, I 
cannot escape responsibility. 
Much has been said about my management style, a style 
that's worked successfully for me during eight years as 
governor of California and for most of my presidency. The 
way I work is to identify the problem, find the right 
individuals to do the job and then let them go to it. I've 
found this invariably brings out the best in people. They 
seem to rise to their full capability, and in the long run 
you get more done. 
When it came to managing the N.S.C. staff, let's face 
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it, my style didn't match its previous track record. I've 
already begun correcting this. As a start, yesterday I met 
with the entire professional staff of the National Security 
Council. I defined for them the values I want to guide the 
national security policies of this country. I told them 
that I wanted a policy that was as justifiable and 
understandable in public as it was in secret. I wanted a 
policy that reflected the will of the Congress as well as 
the White House. And I told them that there'll be no more 
freelancing by individuals when it comes to our national 
security. 
You've heard a lot about the staff of the National 
Security Council in recent months. I can tell you, they are 
good and dedicated Government employees, who put in long 
hours for the nation's benefit. They are eager and anxious 
to serve their country. 
One thing still upsetting me, however, is that no one 
kept proper records of meetings or decisions. This led to 
my failure to recollect whether I approved an arms shipment 
before or after the fact. I did approve it; I just can't 
say specifically when. Rest assured, there's plenty of 
record-keeping now going on at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. 
For nearly a week now, I've been studying the board's 
report. I want the American people to know that this 
wrenching ordeal of recent months has not been in vain. I 
endorse every one of the Tower board's recommendations. In 
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fact, I'm going beyond its recommendations, so as to put the 
house in even better order. 
I'm taking action in three basic areas--personnel, 
national security policy and the process for making sure 
that the system works. 
First, personnel. I've brought in an accomplished and 
highly respected new team here at the White House. They 
bring new blood, new energy, and new credibility and 
experience. 
Former Senator Howard Baker, my new chief of staff, 
possesses a breadth of legislative and foreign affairs 
skills that's impossible to match. I'm hopeful that his 
experience as minority and majority leader of the Senate can 
help us forge a new partnership with the Congress, 
especially on foreign and national security policies. I'm 
genuinely honored that he's given up his own Presidential 
aspirations to serve the country as my chief of staff. 
Frank Carlucci, my new national security adviser, is 
respected for his experience in government and trusted for 
his judgment and counsel. Under him, the N.S.C. staff is 
being rebuilt with proper management discipline. Already, 
almost half the N.s.c. professional staff is comprised of 
new people. 
Yesterday I nominated William Webster, a man of 
sterling reputation, to be Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Mr. Webster has served as Director of 
the F.B.I. and as a u.s. District Court judge. He 
understands the meaning of "Rule of Law." 
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So that his knowledge of national security matters can 
be available to me on a continuing basis, I will also 
appoint John Tower to serve as a member of my Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board. 
I am considering other changes in personnel, and I'll 
move more furniture as I see fit in the weeks and months 
ahead. 
Second, in the area of national security policy, I have 
ordered the N.S.C. to begin a comprehensive review of all 
covert operations. 
I have also directed that any covert activity be in 
support of clear policy objectives and in compliance with 
American values. I expect a covert policy that if Americans 
saw it on the front page of their newspaper, they'd say, 
"That makes sense." 
I have had issued a directive prohibiting the N.s.c. 
staff itself from undertaking covert operations--no if's, 
and's or but's. 
I have asked Vice President Bush to reconvene his task 
force on terrorism to review our terrorist policy in light 
of the events that have occurred. 
Third, in terms of the process of reaching national 
security decisions, I am adopting in total the Tower 
report's model of how the N.s.c. process and staff should 
work. I am directing Mr. Carlucci to take the necessary 
steps to make that happen. He will report back to me on 
further reforms that might be needed. 
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I've created the post of N.S.C. legal adviser to assure 
a greater sensitivity to matters of law. 
I am also determined to make the Congressional 
oversight process work. Proper procedures for consultation 
with the Congress will be followed, not only in letter but 
in spirit. 
Before the end of March I will report to the Congress 
on all the steps I've taken in line with the Tower board's 
conclusions. 
Now what should happen when you make a mistake is this: 
You take your knocks, you learn your lessons and then you 
move on. That's the healthiest way to deal with a problem. 
This in no way diminishes the importance of the other 
continuing investigations, but the business of our country 
and out people must proceed. I've gotten this message from 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress, from allies around 
the world--and if we're reading the signals right, even from 
the Soviets. And, of course, I've heard the message from 
you, the American people. 
You know, by the time you reach my age, you've made 
plenty of mistakes if you've live your life properly. So 
you learn. You put things in perspective. You pull your 
energies together. You change. You go forward. 
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My fellow Americans, I have a great deal that I want to 
accomplish with you and for you over the next two years, 
and, the Lord willing, that's exactly what I intend to do. 
Goodnight and God bless you. 
